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The Vienna Convention:  




The importance of the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods1 (hereinafter ‘Convention’ or ‘CISG’) is widely recognised 
all over the world.2 This becomes obvious due to the fact that 70 countries3 are parties to 
the Convention4 leading to a possible application of its provisions to contracts of sale of 
goods throughout these parts of the world.5 Additionally, parties, having their place of 
business in a country not signatory to the Convention, can freely choose the CISG to be 
applicable to their international sales contracts.  
The Convention’s important role in international trade is closely connected with the idea 
the drafters of the CISG had in mind while working on it, which was to produce a 
uniform body of law applicable to contracts for the international sale of goods.6 The 
objective was to remove existing legal barriers in this field of law and to promote its 
                                                 
1 Also known as the Vienna Convention; Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1980). 
2 See Visser ‘Gaps in the CISG’, chapter I. 1. 
3 As at  01 February 2007 
4 A list of the countries, which are party to the CISG can be seen on the web: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html 
5 According to art 1 (1) CISG, the Convention applies between parties whose place of business are in 
contracting states or when the applicable private international law leads to the application of the law of a 
contracting state.  
6 See Felemegas ‘Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation’, p. 269 
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development.7 In fact, the Convention was the result of efforts of more than five decades 
pushing towards unified sales law.8 
This long and slow process can easily be explained by thinking about the inherent 
conflict of clashing (legal9) cultures with different needs and demands. Consequently, 
the unification of the law of sales contract with the goal of being applied as widely as 
possible could only be achieved by finding compromises which still had to be suitable 
and effective. This hurdle was well taken by the delegates from all over the world 
charged with the drafting of the CISG.  
Nevertheless, this doesn’t mean that there were no aspects of law on which the drafting 
body – the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) - 
couldn’t reach any agreement. Due to the  compromise-driven drafting process and the 
complexity o the law itself, inevitable gaps – outside as well as within the scope of the 
CISG10 – are visible. Furthermore, symptoms of aging can be determined within the 
Convention partly due to the misjudgment of the practicality of certain provisions and 
partly due to developments which were not foreseeable at this point in time, mainly of a 
technical and economic nature.11 A good example therefore is the whole issue of 
electronic commerce absolutely not developed in 1980 but of great importance in 
international trade in our days. 
The danger specifically arising out of gaps within the scope of the Convention – so 
called gaps praeter legem12 - is significant. In case of such gaps - but also when 
ambiguities or uncertainties arise - the temptation to directly resort to domestic law, to 
be determined by the rules of private international law of the forum, is high. Recourse to 
domestic law however is not compatible with the goal to achieve uniformity due to the 
fact that differences in the national law result in undesired differing decisions and finally 
                                                 
7 See Povrzenic ‘Interpretation and gap-filling’, Introduction 
8 Starting point were the 1930s with the first drafts drawn up by Ernst Rabel for UNIDROIT; see also 
Chapter II., p. 6 of this dissertation; Koneru ‘The International Interpretation’, Introduction; Bonell ‘The 
Unidroit Principles and CISG’, part 1. 
9 Common law and civil law countries had to be satisfied. 
10 A distinction between these two kinds of gaps will be made in Chapter V. 1., p. 20 of this dissertation. 
11 See Schlechtriem ‘Interpretation, gap-filling’, preliminary remarks 
12 For the purpose of this dissertation, any reference to ‘gaps’ has to be seen as a reference to gaps praeter 
legem. 
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in uncertainty.13 Furthermore, this is also contrary to the intention of parties choosing the 
CISG to govern their specific relationship in order to exclude the applicability of a 
certain domestic law.14 
In order to uphold the main purpose of the CISG – to create uniformity in the field of 
international law for the sales of goods - resorting to domestic law has to be seen as the 
last exit to fill existing gaps within the Convention.15 In other words, one should try and 
work towards a uniform approach for filling those gaps, which minimises the use of 
domestic law. Starting point therefore is art 7 (2) of the CISG, which is concerned with 
the issue of gap-filling.  
 
After giving an introductory overview of the legal history of art 7 (2) CISG in Chapter 
II., I will then examine the role of art 7 (1) and (2) CISG (Chapter III.), before briefly 
discussing the principles of interpretation, enshrined in art 7 (2) CISG, in Chapter IV.. 
Main focus of the paper will then be to explain the gap-filling methodology of the 
Convention in Chapter V. and to give a survey of the general principles to be applied in 
order to fill gaps in accordance with art 7 (2) CISG in Chapter VI.. 
   
II. LEGAL HISTORY OF ART 7 (2) CISG 
In order to fully comprehend the functioning of art 7 (2) CISG, it is important to have a 
closer look at the legal history of this specific provision. Starting with the predecessors 
of art 7 (2) CISG, this dissertation will finally investigate how its final version came into 
force, mainly by discussing the different proposals of which gap-filling approach should 
prevail in the Convention. 
                                                 
13 See Felemegas ‘Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation’, p. 269 
14 See Felemegas ‘Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation’, p. 272 
15 See Felemegas ‘Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation’, p. 270 
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1. Draft of Uniform Sales Law of 193516 
The first important reference to gap-filling within the law of international sales of 
goods can be found in the draft of the Uniform Sales Law of 1935, which was 
launched by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(UNIDROIT). Art 11 of the draft ruled that gaps not expressly settled in the statute 
had to be filled with general principles on which this statute is based unless it 
provides for the application of a national law.17 
Already at this early point in time, the drafters had recognised that having recourse 
to domestic law in order to fill gaps represents a main danger for creating a truly 
uniform legal system of law.18 Consequently, art 11 restricted the application of 
national law only to cases, where the draft ‘formally’ contained a provision to this 
effect.      
2. Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS) 
The work of UNIDROIT culminated in the Uniform Law on the International Sale of 
Goods of 196419 (hereinafter ‘ULIS’) - also known as the Hague Sales Law - which 
went a step further in preventing the use of domestic law. 
Two provisions of ULIS are to be mentioned, dealing with the interpretation of this 
statute and – in particular – with the method of filling gaps within its scope of 
application: 
(1) The first provision – art 2 ULIS – states:  
‘Rules of private international law shall be excluded for the purpose of the 
application of the present Law, subject to any provision to the contrary in the 
said Law’. 
                                                 
16 The draft is published in Ernst Rabel, RabelsZ, p. 8 
17 Wording of art 11 of the draft of the Uniform Sales Law of 1935: ‘If this Statute does not expressly 
settle a question and does not formally provide for application of a national law, the court decides in 
conformity with the general principles on which this Statute is based’ 
18 See therefor Ernst Rabel, RabelsZ 
19 The Convention is available online at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-ulis.htm 
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(2) The second provision – art 17 ULIS – dealing with the problem of gap-filling, 
reads as follows: 
‘Questions concerning matters governed by this Law which are not expressly 
settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which 
the present Law is based’. 
If both provisions are read together, it becomes obvious that the intention of ULIS 
was clearly ‘to constitute a self-contained law of sales, to be construed and applied 
autonomously, i.e., without any reference to or interference from the different 
national laws.’20 This ‘revolutionary’ approach of creating a self-sufficient and 
independent set of rules strengthened the way towards a codification of the 
international law for the sale of goods to be applied in a uniform manner. 
Although the wording of art. 2 ULIS seems to be clear, there were diverging 
opinions on the interpretation of these provisions in respect to the question, to what 
extent private international law had to be excluded when dealing with the process of 
filling gaps.  
Mostly, art 2 ULIS was interpreted to mean that gap-filling should exclusively be 
done in conformity with general principles.21 In the absence of general principles to 
be derived from the provisions of ULIS itself, they would have to be found through a 
comparative legal analysis.22    
However, others still favoured the use of domestic law, to be determined by the rules 
of private international law, in order to fill gaps in the event that no general 
principles could be extracted out of the provisions of ULIS itself.23 
The courts only developed a few general principles from the provisions of the ULIS 
itself.24 Interestingly, a significant number of court decisions on the ULIS decided 
                                                 
20 See Bianca/Bonell Commentary, p. 66 
21 See therefor Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 3. with references to other authors, supporting this view.  
22 See supra note 21 
23 See supra note 21 
24 For example the principle of good faith: OLG Düsseldorf January 20, 1983, in Schlechtriem 
Internationale Rechtsprechung, art 17, para 7; the principle of reasonableness: Hof Amsterdam January 5, 
1978, S & S 1978, 79; the prohibition against abuse: OLG Karlsruhe July 25, 1986 in RIW 1986, 818; 
further the principle that the place of performance for payment as well as repayment of the purchase price 
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that, if no general principle could be ascertained in ULIS itself, the issue in matter 
had to be regarded as not subject to ULIS, which consequently had to be decided in 
accordance with the applicable domestic law, determined by rules of private 
international law.25 From my point of view, these decisions can be criticised due to 
the improper application of art 17 ULIS: According to this provision, one has first to 
decide whether or not the matter is governed – but not expressly settled – by ULIS, 
before having recourse to general principles. This order was overturned in the 
mentioned court decisions. 
Although this gap-filling approach was rather progressive, the success of ULIS was 
small. One reason therefore, was the use of untranslatable civil law concepts.26Only 
nine states ratified it, including seven from Western Europe.27 
3. UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)     
In 1968, the newly born United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) decided to start a new attempt in developing a uniform law in the field 
of international sale of goods28, ending in 1980 in the well known CISG. 
Concerning the CISG, the issue of gap-filling was very controversially discussed, 
although one could think that due to its goal of uniformity, the fundamental idea of 
restricting the need of domestic law should have been undisputed. 
                                                                                                                                                
is the seller's place of business: BGH October 22, 1980, BGHZ 78, 257; the principle that, in case of 
doubt, payments have to be applied first to interest on default, then to the oldest outstanding debt: Rb. 
Alkmaar May 27, 1982, in Schlechtriem Internationale Rechtsprechung, art 17, para 4; Hof Amsterdam 
November 4, 1982, Ned. IPR 1983 No. 215; the principle that the law of the seller is applicable to issues 
of prescription: OLG Schleswig-Holstein April 8, 1992, RIW 1992, 582; the principle that in case of doubt 
the payment has to be made in the currency at the creditor's place of business: OLG Koblenz January 21, 
1983, in Schlechtriem Internationale Rechtsprechung, art 17, para 8; and finally the principle that the 
theory of complete restitution applies to compensation for damages: BGH November 28, 1990, NJW 
1991, 639 (640) 
25 See eg for the transfer of rights (OLG Hamm July 1, 1982, in Schlechtriem Internationale 
Rechtsprechung, art 17 para 5), the Ordinance (OLG Koblenz March 1, 1985, Art. 17 No. 11), the liability 
for third parties (BFH March 14, 1984, NJW 1984, 2034; OLG Hamm December 19, 1983, in 
Schlechtriem Internationale Rechtsprechung, art 40 para 7) and the setoff (AG Frankfurt January 31, 
1991, IPRax 1991, 345) 
26 See Honnold ‘The Sales Convention’, p. 207 
27 Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, S. Marino, United Kingdom, 
Gambia and Israel 
28 See Bonell ‘The Unidroit Principles and CISG’, part 1. 
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As a consequence, this matter was completely ruled out in the early stages of the 
drafting discussions29 and was still disputed at the Diplomatic Conference of 1980.30 
The proposals for the gap-filling mechanism in the CISG can be divided into two 
groups: 
(1) The first group of representatives who favoured an approach contrary to the 
one set out in art 17 ULIS (see above), argued in favour for the recourse to 
specific legal set of rules, already in existence in order to fill gaps within the 
CISG. Their main argument for this way of gap-filling was that reference to 
‘general principles’ would be too uncertain to provide guidance.31 They argued 
for instance that the existence of general principles was very doubtful due to 
the fact that the Convention didn’t mention them. Examples for this point of 
view can be found in Bulgaria’s proposal, recommending the use of ‘the law of 
the seller’s place of business’32 and the Czechoslovakian proposal preferring 
‘the law applicable by nature of the rules of private international rules’33 to be 
the source of law. 
(2) The second group of representatives who favoured the wording of art 17 ULIS, 
pleaded for the recourse to ‘general principles’ of the CISG as the primary step 
of filling gaps within the scope of the Convention. Emphasising the need to 
have in mind the international character of the CISG and its goal to create 
uniformity, they stressed that recourse to domestic law would increase 
uncertainty even more and would therefore contradict the process of unifying 
the law.34 According to Italy’s proposal, reference should be made first to the 
general principles on which the Convention is based and only in the absence of 
such principles should national law of each of the parties be taken into 
account.35 
                                                 
29 See implementation of the Commission’s decisions relating to General Conditions of Sale and Standard 
Contracts in U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/54 (1971); see Povrzenic ‘Interpretation and gap-filling’, part 2. 
30 See Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 3. 
31 See Rosenberg ‘The Vienna Convention’, p. 448 
32 See the proposal of Bulgaria in: A/Conf.97/C.1/L.16, p. 87 
33 See the proposal of Czechoslovakia in: A/Conf.98/C.1/L.15, p. 87 
34 See Rosenberg ‘The Vienna Convention’, p. 448 
35 See the proposal of Italy in: A/Conf.97/C.1/L.59 
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However – due to different reasons – none of those proposed approaches gained 
sufficient support among the delegates. 
The representatives finally agreed – with a small majority of 17:14 with 11 
abstentions36 – on the following compromise solution between these two groups of 
thoughts: The first part of the Italian proposal, referring to ‘general principles’ was 
kept. Meanwhile, the second part of that proposal - bearing possible difficulties in its 
application - was replaced with the Czechoslovakian proposal. Thus, the final 
wording of art 7 (2) CISG reads as follows: 
‘Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly 
settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is 
based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by 
virtue of the rules of private international law.’ 
Today, this combined gap-filling approach of having recourse to domestic law only 
as the last exit in case of an absence of applicable ‘general principles’ can be found 
not only in the CISG. The same approach was adopted in more recent conventions 
on the field of Private Law.37 
 
III. ROLE OF ART 7 (1) AND (2) CISG: ‘ANTI-AGING-TOOLS’ 
As mentioned before, the CISG was finally accomplished more than 26 years ago in 
1980. Due to the pace of new developments on the field of international trade, the 
provisions of the Convention are confronted with situations which haven’t been foreseen 
while drafting the Convention. As a consequence, inevitable aging symptoms are getting 
more and more obvious. Despite its age, the Convention can still be regarded as the most 
important statute on the field of international trade.  
                                                 
36 See Schlechtriem Commentary (1998), art 7, para 4, footnote 7; Zeller ‘Four-Corners’, chapter V. 4. 
37 See Art. 6(2) Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods, Geneva, 17 February 1983, 
available online at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/1983agency/1983agency-e.htm; Art 6(2) 
Convention on International Financial Leasing, Ottawa, 22 May 1988, available online at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/1988leasing/1988leasing-e.htm; Art. 4(2) Convention on 
International Factoring, Ottawa, 28 May 1988, available online at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/1988factoring/1988factoring-e.htm 
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In the following passage, I will first discuss how the draftsmen of the CISG prevented 
the latter from getting out-fashioned. The hereby extracted different approaches will 
then be briefly compared in order to understand their relationship.  
1. Importance of an internal solution 
The difficulties faced while drafting the CISG have already been discussed at an 
earlier stage. However, it is even harder to think about implementing corrections or 
amendments of the current version of the Convention, necessary to bring its 
provisions up to date with the standards necessary to cope with modern trade. This 
would make it inevitable to reassemble representatives of all contracting states in 
order to work towards this goal.38 It is not unlikely that this would again take years 
of debates, finally often ending in compromise solutions only. Besides that this 
process will have to be repeated regularly because of never ending developments, it 
would be naive to think that all grievances could thereby be solved. 
To avoid this never ending story, the draftsmen apparently had in mind while 
working on the actual wording, convention-internal solutions have been installed 
within the CISG, allowing for a flexible application of its provisions for the purpose 
of keeping pace with the developments. 
It is in particular art 7 CISG with its two paragraphs, which provides two legal 
technical tools due to which the Convention will still have a great importance in the 
future. 
Art 7 (1) CISG39 deals with the interpretation of the Convention40, while art 7 (2) 
CISG concerns the issue of gap-filling. 
While making use of these legal techniques, one should always keep in mind the 
main goal of the CISG – the creation of a uniform law. Therefore, it is extremely 
                                                 
38 See Schlechtriem ‘Interpretation, gap-filling’, Preliminary remarks, p. 1 
39 Wording of art. 7 (1) CISG: ‘In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its 
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good 
faith in international trade.’ 
40 To be distinguished from the scope of art 8 CISG covering the interpretation of specific statements or 
conduct of the individual parties to the transaction. 
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important to apply these tools uniformly. Otherwise, the so-achieved flexibility will 
be counterproductive.   
2. Distinction between art 7 (1) and 7 (2) CISG 
Although the main focus of this dissertation remains on gap-filling in accordance 
with art 7 (2) CISG, it wouldn’t be wise to blend out completely the interpretation of 
the Convention, stipulated in art 7 (1) CISG. Already the placement of these 
provisions shows their close relationship towards each other.41 Moreover, 
interpretative problems also become apparent in relation to art 7 (2) CISG, so that a 
knowledge of the basic principles of interpretation is vital for correctly 
comprehending art 7 (2) CISG.  
To find a clear distinction between the scope of art 7 (1) and (2) CISG is a difficult 
task.42 Some commentators share the opinion that the need to find a clear borderline 
between these techniques shouldn’t be overrated because in practice, it is of little 
interest whether one resorts to interpretative measures or to the method of gap-filling 
in order to find solutions to a particular case caused by further developments.43 
Truly, establishing a distinction, suitable for every particular case, is not 
recommendable due to the fact that the borderline depends on the specific 
circumstances of each particular case and can therefore mostly be blurred.44 
However, this doesn’t mean that it is not essential to clearly distinguish both 
instruments in each single case because of their completely different inherent 
approach.45 
In case of further developments like for example contracting by means of electronic 
communications, one could on the one hand think about broadening existent 
provisions of the CISG, dealing with the issue of declarations and their 
communication46 in accordance with art 7 (1) CISG. On the other hand it would be 
                                                 
41 See Felemegas ‘Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation’, 269 
42 See for example Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 7, para 28 
43 See Schlechtriem ‘Interpretation, gap-filling’, Preliminary remarks 
44 See supra note 43 
45 Same opinion shared in eg Schlechtriem ‘Interpretation, gap-filling’, Preliminary remarks 
46 In particular offer, acceptance, revocation, avoidance, reduction, notice of defects and others  
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possible to assume a gap within the scope of the Convention, leading to the 
application of art 7 (2) CISG.  
3. Relationship between art 7 (1) and 7 (2) CISG 
After having briefly discussed the distinction of the two paragraphs of art 7 CISG, 
the next step is to understand their relationship, important to correctly apply them in 
accordance with the intention of the draftsmen of the CISG. 
Therefore, already the systematic position of the two instruments within art 7 CISG 
gives helpful guidance. Due to the fact that the instrument of interpretation was 
placed in paragraph (1) of art 7 CISG in front of the method of gap-filling, laid down 
in art 7 (2) CISG, there is a very strong indication for the former having an 
overriding position to the latter. This is supported by the fact that a wider 
interpretation of a specific provision constitutes a much smaller intervention in the 
Convention compared to the process of gap-filling. Furthermore, a gap within the 
scope of the Convention – pre-condition for the application of art 7 (2) CISG –47 
demands the existence of an issue not expressly settled in the Convention. This can’t 
be assumed if the scope of a certain provision can be broadened via interpretation. 
Recapitulating, I believe that there can be only one correct understanding of the 
relationship of art 7 (1) and (2) CISG, namely that interpretation in accordance with 
art 7 (1) CISG must first be tried before having recourse to the possibility of gap-
filling, enshrined in art 7 (2) CISG. This view is shared by most commentators.48  
 
IV. PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION – ART 7 (1) CISG 
As seen just above, the instrument of interpretation has a vital role in relation to the 
method of gap-filling. In any case, one has first to check the possibility of a wider 
interpretation of provisions of the CISG before having recourse to the method of gap-
                                                 
47 See thereto Chapter V. 2. on p. 21 of this dissertation  
48 See eg Schlechtriem ‘Interpretation, gap-filling’, part II. 1.; Gebauer ‘Uniform Law’, p. 697; 
Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 7, para 28; Zeller ‘Four-Corners’, chapter V. 5. 
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filling. Moreover, the principles of interpretation, enshrined in art 7 (1) CISG, are to be 
observed also for the purpose of interpreting art 7 (2) CISG. 
Consequently, a brief overview over the interpretation principles, expressly set out in art 
7 (1) CISG, shall now be given49 before moving towards the gap-filling methodology in 
Chapter V. 
Art 7 (1) CISG50 enunciates three principles of interpretation, which have to be 
observed:  
(1) ‘international character’ or origin of the rules; 
(2) ‘need to promote uniformity’;  
(3) ‘observance of good faith’. 
1.  ‘International character’ – prohibition of domestic concepts 
Firstly, art 7 (2) CISG demands that, when interpreting the Convention ‘regard is to 
be had to its international character’. In other words, the interpretation of the CISG 
has to be done in the light of the origin of the rules.51 
The reason for reminding any applicant of the Convention of its international 
character can easily be explained with the goal to create a uniform law in order to 
replace any provisions of a particular legal system previously governing issues 
within its scope.52 The mere adoption of the CISG by each single state without 
requiring them to uniformly interpret it wouldn’t be very successful due to 
differences in the legal as well as social understanding. This already becomes 
obvious when you look at the different approaches prevailing in civil law and 
common law countries. Civil law judges for example give more weight to 
preparatory materials and the legal history of a statute, while their colleagues in 
                                                 
49 For more detailed comments thereto, please have recourse to the literature mentioned in the following 
footnotes 
50 See supra note 39 for the wording of art 7 (1) CISG 
51 See Schlechtriem Commentary (1998), art 7, para 6; more detailed Schlechtriem ‘Interpretation, gap-
filling’, part I. 2. a) 
52 See Povrzenic ‘Interpretation and gap-filling’, part 3(A) 
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common law countries often stick to a plain meaning and grammatical structure of a 
statute.53 
But what exactly is meant when art 7 (1) CISG demands that a proper interpretation 
of the Convention has to take into account its international character? It has to be 
understood as an obligation, leading towards an autonomous interpretation of the 
provisions of the CISG.54 This requires anybody concerned with the interpretation of 
the wording of the Convention, to refrain from rules or techniques in existence for 
the interpretation of domestic law.55 This view is not only shared amongst most of 
the commentators, but also by courts.56 Consequently, the interpretation of the 
Convention’s terms and concepts is to be done in the context of the Convention 
itself.57 However, the extension of the ban of recourse to domestic law is disputed. 
Some commentators share the view that a study of comparative law shall be 
admissible as the last exit58, while others argue in the opposite direction, mentioning 
the risk of obtaining diverging jurisprudence to be increased hereby.59 The latter 
group of commentators nevertheless accepts the recourse to domestic law concepts, 
‘when either the legislative history or the Convention itself lead to the conclusion 
that the drafters referred to concepts peculiar to a specific domestic legal system’60 
For the purpose of clarification, it has to be pointed out, that ‘autonomous 
interpretation’ is not a method of interpretation additionally to the established set of 
methods – literal, systematic, teleological and historical interpretation – but rather a 
principle of interpretation that gives preference to a particular kind of teleological 
and systematic argument in interpreting a legal text.61 
                                                 
53 See supra note 52 
54 See eg Schlechtriem ‘Interpretation, gap-filling’, part I. 2. a); Brandner ‘Admissibility of Analogy’, part 
II. A. 1.; Povrzenic ‘Interpretation and gap-filling’, part 3(A); Gebauer ‘Uniform Law’, p. 685 
55 see supra note 54 
56 See for example Germany: BGH [Supreme Court], No. VIII ZR 51/95, April 3, 1996, Unilex database 
(1996) 
57 See Gebauer ‘Uniform Law’, p. 685-686 
58 See Brandner ‘Admissibility of Analogy’, part II. A. 1. 
59 See Ferrari ‘Uniform Interpretation’, part VIII. 
60 See supra note 59 
61 See in more detail Gebauer ‘Uniform Law’, p. 686 
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To give an example, an autonomous interpretation of words requires to the 
awareness of the possibility that a particular word doesn’t necessarily have to have 
the same meaning as in domestic law.62 Furthermore, if conflicting interpretations 
are looming because of the fact, that the Convention is drafted in several languages, 
the literal meaning of the term or concept in all authentic versions has to be taken 
into account in order to eliminate this risk.63  
At first sight, the concept of an autonomous interpretation can easily be seen as 
unproblematic. However, a closer look at it betrays the difficult challenge to every 
practitioner, namely to completely put aside certain preconceptions of their own 
domestic law. 
2. ‘Promote uniformity in its [CISG] application’  
Back to the wording of art 7 (1) CISG, the reader is further being told that ‘regard is 
to be had […] to the need to promote uniformity in its [the Convention] application’. 
Among the commentators of the CISG, you can sometimes find the allegation that 
the promotion of uniformity is a logical consequence of interpreting the Convention 
with regard to its international character, as described above.64 Consequently, they 
don’t attribute an independent function to the need to promote uniformity. 
In my opinion, this allegation is not completely true. Of course, an autonomous 
interpretation is a big step in the direction to a uniform application of the CISG. 
However, it can’t be seen as a guarantee to achieve uniformity. On the one hand, it is 
not unlikely that two different courts render two diverging ‘autonomous’ 
interpretations of a specific rule.65 On the other hand, some believe that these two 
principles do not always favour the same results, leading to the question, which of 
these principles prevails over the other in case of conflicts.66  
                                                 
62 See supra note 58 
63 See Gebauer ‘Uniform Law’, p. 686 
64 See for example Povrzenic ‘Interpretation and gap-filling’, part 3(A) 
65 See Gebauer ‘Uniform Law’, p. 685 
66 See supra note 65 
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Clearly, the aim to promote uniformity sets out the task to develop a uniform method 
of interpretation.67 Additionally, this principle implies that every jurisprudence has at 
least the obligation to observe foreign decisions.68 Today, this is not an almost 
impossible task due to several web-sites, providing a wide range of international case 
law.69 Anyhow, it has to be pointed out that foreign decisions do not have a binding 
effect on tribunals of another country.70 They merely have a persuasive value.71  
3. ‘Observance of good faith in international trade’ 
Besides the necessity to have regard to the international character of the Convention 
and the need to promote uniformity in its application, art 7 (1) CISG finally sets out 
the necessity to observe good faith in international trade. 
This reference to the standard of good faith is the reason for mainly two 
controversially argued problems: 
First, it is disputed, how this reference to good faith in connection with the 
interpretation has to be understood. Is it supposed to be only an additional criterion 
for the interpretation of the Convention itself or is it addressed to the parties to each 
particular contract of sale as well.72 As the observance of good faith is surely to be 
observed in relation to the interpretation of the provisions of the Convention, this 
dispute will further be examined under Chapter V. 
A second question occurs regarding the exact understanding of the term ‘good faith’ 
in international trade.73 Even if the notion of good faith in art 7 (1) CISG is to be 
understood as a mere instrument of interpretation, good faith may lead to a conflict 
                                                 
67 See Brandner ‘Admissibility of Analogy’, part II. A. 1. 
68 See Brandner ‘Admissibility of Analogy’, part II. A. 1.; Honnold ‘The Sales Convention’, p. 210 
69 See for example http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2376&dsmid=14315, 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ and http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/links.html for links to other web-sites 
related to the CISG 
70 See for a more detailed discussion of this problem Ferrari ‘Gap-filling’, p. 71-73 
71 See Ferrari ‘Gap-filling’, p. 72-73 with reference to Italian court decisions, confirming this point of 
view 
72 See therefor for example Povrzenic ‘Interpretation and gap-filling’, part 3(B); Ferrari ‘Gap-filling’, 
p. 74 
73 See Povrzenic ‘Interpretation and gap-filling’, part 3(A) 
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with the main goal of the CISG, i.e., the promotion of its uniform application.74 The 
reason therefor is the fact that no common understanding of the notion of good faith 
is to be found on a comparative level.75 The vagueness of the definition of good faith 
makes some authors fear that the jurisprudence won’t be able to develop a common 
definition.76 Although the principle of good faith is an important concept in every 
legal system, a comparative study shows completely different approaches of its 
scope: 
In most common law countries like for example in the United States77, the scope of 
application of the concept of good faith is limited to the performance of the contract 
only. However, this meaning can not only be found in to common law systems. The 
French Code Civil78 for example also contains a similar restriction in art 1134 (3)79 
of the Code Civil. In contrast to that, civil law systems generally apply the principle 
of good faith not only to the performance, but also to the formation and the 
interpretation of the contract.80 
As said before, these diverging concepts of good faith are in conflict with the 
promotion of the uniform application of the CISG. 
To avoid conflicting jurisprudence to the most possible extent, it is at least evident 
that the reference to ‘good faith in international trade’ in art. 7 (1) CISG means that 
recourse to own national standards should be allowed only to the extent that they are 
assured to be recognised at a comparative level.81 
 
                                                 
74 See Ferrari ‘Gap-filling’, p. 74 
75 See supra note 74 
76 See supra note 74 with references to other authors sharing this view 
77 See the (U.S.A.) Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) § 1-203 (1978) ('Every contract or duty within 
this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.') and the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 205 ('Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing 
in its performance and its enforcement.') 
78 France is part of the civil law family 
79 Wording of art 1134 (3) of the French Code Civil: ‘Elles doivent être executées de bonne foi.’ 
80 See for example § 157 of the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch: ‘Verträge sind so auszulegen, wie Treu 
und Glauben mit Rücksicht auf die Verkehrssitte es erfordern.’; Art 12 of the Croatian Code of 
obligations: ‘In the formation of obligations and enforcement of rights and duties resulting there from, 
parties to the transactions are bound by the principle of good faith.’ 
81 See Povrzenic ‘Interpretation and gap-filling’, part 3(B); Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 7, 
para 18 
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V. THE GAP-FILLING METHODOLOGY – ART 7 (2) CISG  
After having had a closer look on the relationship between art 7 (1) and 7 (2) CISG and 
on the basic principles of interpretation, the main focus shall now be laid upon art 7 (2) 
CISG and its gap-filling methodology. 
As we’ve seen above, gap-filling has an important role of preventing the Convention to 
become outfashioned due to developments in international trade unforeseeable at the 
time it was drafted. However, a differing understanding of the instrument of gap-filling, 
leading to diverging jurisprudence and thereby to legal uncertainty, finally endangers the 
goal of promoting uniformity in the application of the CISG. Consequently, it is crucial 
for the success of the Convention to develop a uniform approach to gap-filling.  
Hence, I will now thoroughly examine how art 7 (2) CISG and its gap-filling 
methodology is understood amongst commentators and the jurisprudence in order to 
hopefully determine a widespread common understanding of how art 7 (2) CISG should 
be applied. 
1. Locating gaps ‘praeter legem’ 
Before further discussing the different gap-filling methods, the first logical step is to 
determine such a gap. 
Generally, a gap can be characterized as an unintentional incompleteness in the 
convention.82 Thus, in general, no gap can be assumed if the draftsmen of the CISG 
intentionally omitted regulating a specific question. 
However, it has to be distinguished between so called gaps ‘praeter legem’ and gaps 
‘intra legem’.  
Only an internal convention gap or - in other words - a gap within the scope of the 
Convention, often called gap ‘praeter legem’83, is to be filled in accordance with art 
                                                 
82 See Brandner ‘Admissibility of Analogy’, part I. A.  
83 In the following, a reference to ‘gap(s)’ shall be seen as a reference to gap(s) ‘praeter legem’, unless it is 
stated otherwise 
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7 (2) CISG.84 This correctly reflects the directive of this paragraph requesting 
‘matters governed by this [the CISG] Convention’.85  
In contrast to that, gaps ‘intra legem’ (i.e. matters excluded from the scope of the 
CISG) are not to be solved in accordance with art 7 (2) CISG. Instead, they are 
governed by the respective national laws, to be determined in each single case by the 
applicable private international law.86 
It is sometimes difficult – due to a rather uncertain borderline –87 to determine 
whether or not a specific question is governed by the Convention or not. Some 
matters are expressly excluded from the scope of the Convention like for example 
the ones mentioned in art 2, 3, 4, 5, 28 and 54 CISG. Additionally, rights based on 
fraud or agency law are also not governed by the CISG.88 However, there are many 
controversially discussed matters of law remaining.89 In each single case in dispute, 
the Convention has to be thoroughly interpreted according to the principles of 
interpretation enshrined in art 7 (1) CISG. Looking at the legislative history of the 
CISG appears to be one helpful resource to solve these disputes. 
2. Admissibility of ‘analogy’ as a gap-filling instrument 
Once a gap ‘praeter legem’ is located, another question in dispute springs up, 
regarding the admissibility of analogy as a gap-filling instrument of the CISG. 
Decisive for this question is how art 7 (2) CISG is to be interpreted. According to 
this paragraph, gaps within the scope of the Convention are to be settled by having 
recourse to general principles and, if this is not possible, by application of domestic 
law, to be determined by private international law. 
This wording seems to imply that other gap-filling methods besides the one 
mentioned in art 7 (2) CISG are not admissible. Precisely, the admissibility of the 
instrument of analogy is questionable. 
                                                 
84 See for example Visser ‘Gaps in the CISG’, chapter II. 2. 
85 See the complete wording of art 7 (2) CISG on p. 11 of this dissertation 
86 See Visser ‘Gaps in the CISG’, chapter II. 2. 
87 See for example Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 4. a) 
88 See Rosenberg ‘The Vienna Convention’, p. 446 
89 See supra note 87 for some examples 
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The fact that art 7 (2) CISG does not expressly mention analogy as one of the 
possibilities of filling gaps in the Convention appears to be curious especially from a 
German perspective, where analogy is the most important method of gap-filling90 but 
also from a perspective of other civil law systems like for example in Italy91 and 
Austria92. 
To respond to this question, it is necessary to apply the principles of interpretation, 
enshrined in art 7 (1) CISG93 in respect of art 7 (2) CISG. Whether or not the 
analogical application of a provision as a way of gap-filling besides recourse to the 
general principles is admissible depends on how this paragraph is to be interpreted: 
broadly or restrictively?94 
Analogy wouldn’t be admissible, if a historical interpretation reveals that the drafters 
of the CISG intentionally omitted to mention analogy as a gap-filler.95  
On the one hand, they must have been aware of analogy as another way of gap-
filling because of the long tradition especially in Europe96 and South America 
distinguishing between having recourse to general principles and an analogical 
application.97 This view can be strengthened by the fact that already the admissibility 
of analogy under art 17 ULIS was intensively discussed in the academic literature 
and finally affirmed. 
                                                 
90 See Brandner ‘Admissibility of Analogy’, part I. B. 
91 See for example art 12 (2) Diposizionni preliminarie al Codice civile (Italy, 1942): ‘Whenever a case 
cannot be decided on the basis of a precise provision of the written law, recourse shall be had to provisions 
governing similar or analogous cases or matters. If the case still remains doubtful, it shall be decided 
according to the general principles of the juridical order of the State.’ 
92 First in this way is art 7 of the Austrian Civil Code (1811): ‘If a case cannot be solved either by the text 
or the natural sense of a written provision, recourse shall be had to similar cases expressly provided for in 
other provisions of the law and to principles of analogous provisions. If the case still remains in doubt, it 
shall be decided according to the principles of natural law, taking into careful consideration all the 
circumstances of the case.’ 
93 See Chapter IV. on p. 14 of this dissertation 
94 See Felemegas ‘Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation’, p. 280, Ferrari ‘Gap-filling’, p. 81 
95 See Brandner ‘Admissibility of Analogy’, part II. B. 2. 
96 See for example supra note 91, 92 
97 See Brandner ‘Admissibility of Analogy’, part II. B. 3. 
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On the other hand, it has to be said that, since UNCITRAL took over the task of 
unifying the law on international sales contracts, the word ‘analogy’ wasn’t 
mentioned at all in any of the discussions, leading to the final version of the CISG.98  
Consequently, the legal history of art 7 (2) CISG is inconclusive in respect of the 
admissibility of analogy as a gap-filler.   
Despite that the unanimous answer to this question amongst the commentators is that 
analogy must be admissible.99 
Some don’t even raise this problem because to them, the admissibility of analogy is 
self-evident,100 while others support this view rather casually without giving detailed 
reasons for it.101 
However, there are some authors who give a more detailed reasoning to this 
question.102 The main argument towards admissibility is an argumentum a fortiori: If 
recourse to general principles is admissible than this must – a fortiori – count for 
analogy as well, since general principles can be applied more widely and are less 
connected to the text of the CISG itself.103 
From my point of view, the admissibility of analogy can already be affirmed by 
properly interpreting art 7 (2) CISG in accordance with the principles of 
interpretation, especially the need to promote uniformity in its application, enshrined 
in art 7 (1) CISG. In order to restrict the application of domestic law as much as 
possible and thereby promoting a uniform application of the Convention, art 7 (2) 
CISG must be understood broadly, also allowing analogy besides the recourse to 
                                                 
98 See supra note 97; However, the summaries of the discussions, available in the Yearbooks and Official 
Records do not record word by word what has been said. 
99 See for example Brandner ‘Admissibility of Analogy’, part I. B.; Ferrari ‘Uniform Interpretation’, part. 
XIII; Schlechtriem Commentary (1998), art 7, para 34; Gebauer ‘Uniform Law’, p. 696 with references to 
others 
100 See Brandner ‘Admissibility of Analogy’, part I. B., footnote 8, which contains references to some 
authors 
101 See  Brandner ‘Admissibility of Analogy’, part I. B., footnote 9, which contains references to some 
authors; Povrzenic ‘Interpretation and gap-filling’, part 4. 
102 See Brandner ‘Admissibility of Analogy’, I. B. 
103 See supra note 102 
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general principles. Another interpretation would be contrary to art 7 (1) CISG and its 
main goal, the promotion of uniformity. 104 
3. Relationship between ‘analogy’ the ‘general principles’ 
After having discussed the admissibility of analogy as a gap-filler under the 
Convention, the next step is to examine the method of analogy in relation to the 
other gap-filling instrument: the recourse to general principles on which the CISG is 
based. 
This includes not only the attempt to draw up a demarcation line between both gap-
filling methods but also to investigate, whether or not a specific order of application 
has to be observed. 
a) Comparative examination of analogy as a gap-filling method 
To draw up a clear demarcation line between analogy and having recourse to the 
general principles on which the CISG is based is a difficult task.105 Although 
some commentators believe that this distinction has merely a theoretical value106, 
the basic differences should be known when being on the way to fill a particular 
gap in the Convention. Consequently, the following passage will briefly 
investigate how both gap-filling instruments can best be characterized and 
distinguished.  
Starting point of the instrument of analogy is to search for provisions within the 
CISG, dealing with cases similar to the one not expressly settled within the 
Convention. 
From the point of view of Professor Bonell an ‘inherently unjust’ test has to be 
applied in order to determine whether or not an analogical application of a 
specific provision of the Convention is possible. In his words, the case expressly 
governed by the provision of the CISG and the case in question must be so 
                                                 
104 See Schlechtriem Commentary (1998), art 7, para 34 with reference to Hellner in footnote 55 
supporting the same view 
105 See Schlechtriem Commentary (1998), art 7, para 43; Schlechtriem ‘Interpretation, gap-filling’, part 
II. 1. 
106 See Schlechtriem ‘Interpretation, gap-filling’, part II. 1. 
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analogous ‘that it would be inherently unjust not to adopt the same solution’.107 
The problem of such an ‘inherently unjust’ test is to find a common standard to 
determine when a certain case fulfills this criterion. Every person has a different 
understanding of what constitutes an inherently unjust situation.  
Professor Honnold suggests another approach. His proposal focuses on the 
question, whether or not the cases in dispute are so analogous that the drafters 
‘would not have deliberately chosen discordant results’.108 
Due to the above mentioned problem with Professor Bonell’s suggestion, the 
latter approach can be seen as more practicable. 
Irrespective of which approach is preferred analogy merely means to apply a 
specific rule of the Convention to another provision109 as long as there are no 
reasons limiting its analogical application like for example the restriction of this 
specific rule to a particular context.110 
The difference between the two gap-filling methods has again been explained by 
Professor Bonell with the following words: 
‘Recourse to 'general principles' as a means of gap filling differs from 
reasoning by analogy insofar as it constitutes an attempt to find solution 
for the case at hand not by mere extension of specific provisions dealing 
with analogous cases, but on the basis of principles and rules which 
because of their general character may be applied on a much wider 
scale.’111 
                                                 
107 See Rosenberg ‘The Vienna Convention’, p. 450 
108 See supra note 107 
109 See Schlechtriem Commentary (1998), art 7, para 34 
110 See Felemegas ‘Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation’, p. 281 
111 See Bianca/Bonell Commentary, p. 80 
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Others suggest the following distinction: 
If a principle is only contained in one rule of the CISG, then analogy is to be 
applied. However, if a principle underlies several rules, then gap-filling by 
means of general principles is necessary.112 
Recapitulating, in case of an analogical application, a much closer relationship 
between the case at hand and a provision established for similar cases must exist, 
whereas general principles of the CISG can be applied on a much wider scale.113 
b) Priority of analogy? 
Another point of interest concerning analogy and the instrument of having 
recourse to the general principles on which the Convention is based is the issue 
of their order of application. 
In particular, it is disputed whether or not the analogical application of a certain 
provision should be tried before filling a specific gap by means of general 
principles or in absence of the latter by applying domestic law to be determined 
by private international law. 
Most commentators support the view that the first attempt to fill a certain 
question not expressly settled in the Convention is to be made by analogical 
application of specific provisions of the CISG.114  
This order makes sense because of the fact that – as seen above – in case of an 
analogical application the discrepancy between the wording of the Convention 
and the unsolved question is less wide than in case of gap-filling by means of 
general principles. Consequently, I support the opinion, that gap-filling by 
analogical application should be tried first. 
                                                 
112 See Schlechtriem ‘Interpretation, gap-filling’, part II. 1. with references to authors in footnote 30 
113 See Povrzenic ‘Interpretation and gap-filling’, part 4. B. 
114 See for example Felemegas ‘Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation’, p. 281; Bianca/Bonell Commentary, 
p. 78; Povrzenic ‘Interpretation and gap-filling’, part 4.; Ferrari ‘Uniform Interpretation’, part XIII; Zeller 
‘Four-Corners’, chapter V. 5. 
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4. Gap-filling by means of general principles 
After having outlined the method of filling gaps by analogical application, a further 
look shall be had on the gap-filling approach endorsed in art 7 (2) CISG. Thereby, 
main attention shall be turned on the question to what extent general principles have 
to be extracted from the CISG itself. 
a) Different gap-filling approaches 
There are mainly three different approaches to fill gaps ‘praeter legem’ which 
have to be distinguished:  
aa) ‘True Code approach’ 
First of all, there is the ‘true Code approach’, for example chosen by the 
drafters of ULIS.115 It is based on the application of general principles on 
which the specific Code is based, a system well known in civil law systems 
in order to replace the complete body of pre-existing law.116 This means that 
a gap within a Code shall only be filled by looking at the Code itself, 
‘including the purposes of the Code and the policies underlying the Code, but 
no further.’117 
The supporters of this approach share the belief that a ‘true Code’ is self-
sufficient, enabling any questions governed by this Code to be answered by 
having recourse to its framework.118 
bb) ‘Meta-Code approach’ 
In contrast to the ‘true Code approach’, another gap-filling approach called 
the ‘meta-Code approach’, preferably used in common law countries, refers 
                                                 
115 See Chapter II. 2. on p. 7 of this dissertation for a discussion of the provisions of ULIS dealing with 
gap-filling 
116 See Honnold ‘Uniform Law for International Sales’, p. 101; Povrzenic ‘Interpretation and gap-filling’, 
part 4. B. 
117 See Felemegas ‘Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation’, p. 277 
118 See Felemegas ‘Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation’, p. 277-278 
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to external legal principles of law and equity in order to supplement the 
provisions of a Code, unless this is expressly prohibited by the Code.119 The 
phrase ‘principles of law and equity’ is understood to refer to the general 
body of case-law.120  
It is not surprising that this approach is mainly to be found in common law 
countries due to the fact that their main source of law is to be found in case 
law. In contrast to that, the statutory law in common law systems appears to 
be very narrow and specific. Consequently, developments not specifically 
covered by a statute, are faced by enlarging or reshaping the principles on 
which older cases were based.121  
cc) Approach endorsed in the CISG 
In contrast to that, the draftsmen of the CISG agreed upon a different 
approach, reflected in art 7 (2) CISG. As seen above, this agreement has to be 
seen as a compromise agreement between two groups of thought and a 
combination of the foregoing approaches. 
Bearing in mind the results of the interpretation of art 7 (2) CISG discussed 
in Chapter V. 2. and 3. b), gap-filling within the CISG has to be tried in 
accordance with the following order: 
(1) Analogical application of a specific provision of the CISG to an 
unsettled question; 
(2) Having recourse to general principles, on which the CISG is 
based; 
(3) Having recourse to domestic law determined by the applicable 
private international law. 
                                                 
119 See Felemegas ‘Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation’, p. 278 
120 See Honnold ‘Uniform Law for International Sales’, p. 101 in relation to § 1-103 (b) of the (U.S.A.) 
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) 
121 See Felemegas ‘Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation’, p. 279-280; Ferrari ‘Gap-filling’, p. 81; 
Rosenberg ‘The Vienna Convention’, p. 442; Honnold ‘Uniform Law for International Sales’, p. 101 
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b) Nature and determination of general principles 
The functioning of analogy as a means of filling gaps has already been 
examined, so that the following passage is going to concentrate on a 
detailed discussion of the nature and the determination of the general 
principles. 
aa) General discussion 
The importance of omitting the use of domestic law concepts in order 
to avoid diverging decisions within the jurisprudence was already 
mentioned more than once. 
Consequently, this means that it should be tried – to the uttermost 
extent - to fill a gap within the CISG by having recourse to general 
principles on which the CISG is based before referring to domestic 
law.   
However, this must not be overstretched. Art 7 (2) CISG still remains 
the starting point of each gap-filling problem which occurs and has to 
be observed without any exception. Compared to the English version 
of art 7 (2) CISG using the formulation ‘is based’, the French version 
can be seen as weaker because of its wording requiring gap-filling to 
be done in accordance with general principles ‘dont elle [the CISG] 
s'inspire’.122 Due to that little difference within the strength of these 
wordings, doubts can arise as to how closely the general principles 
have to be connected to the Convention itself. However, it has to be 
borne in mind that the English version of the CISG is prevailing when 
it comes to such doubts.123 This can be explained by the fact that 
English was the language of the preliminary drafts as well as the 
deliberations in Vienna.124 This means that the wording of art 7 (2) 
CISG contains a clear restriction as to the source from which the 
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general principles have to be extracted. They must be either expressly 
stated in the CISG itself or must result from it with sufficient clarity.125 
This requirement is not contrary to the main goal of the CISG to create 
uniformity on the field of international law for the sale of goods. 
Although it appears to increase the recourse to domestic law concepts, 
the goal of uniformity would likewise be endangered without this 
criterion.126 The absence of the necessity of such a close connection 
between the general principles and the Convention would likely end up 
in the application of inconsistent and even conflictive general 
principles leading to diverging jurisprudence. Hence, by applying a 
less restrictive approach in respect of extracting the general principles, 
nothing would be gained.    
bb) Connection between the general principles and the CISG 
However, there are still disputes about how close the general 
principles and the CISG itself have to be connected in order to apply 
them as a means of filling gaps in accordance with art 7 (2) CISG. 
In general, the words ‘is based on’ in art 7 (2) CISG mean that there is no 
possibility to apply general principles developed from the law of all nations 
or one particular nation by means of a comparative legal analysis.127 Due to a 
lack of connection between them and the Convention itself, the use of such 
principles would be contrary to art 7 (2) CISG and therefore constitute a 
breach of the CISG. Furthermore, it must be seen as an impossible task for a 
single person applying the CISG to conduct such an intensive comparative 
legal analysis.128  Because of these difficulties, such a person could easily be 
pushed towards applying his own domestic solution to the specific case at 
hand instead of working with unfamiliar foreign laws. This would end up in a 
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diverging application of the CISG and consequently endangering the goal of 
achieving uniformity.  
It is however disputed, whether or not an exemption from this rule has to be 
made for particular general principles outside the CISG. 
I believe that exemptions are not only possible but necessary to sustain the 
status of the CISG as a widely accepted body of uniform law.  
Ulrich Magnus correctly states that an exemption has to be made ‘if and to 
the extent that general basic principles develop or are developed which are 
internationally coordinated and actually find general acceptance.’129 In 
respect to such internationally accepted principles the argument regarding the 
problem to extract general principles by a comparative legal analysis can’t be 
brought forward. By demanding general principles to be internationally 
coordinated and accepted, this problem doesn`t exist. Moreover, it would be 
unwise not to observe the further development in international trade law. If 
newly developed principles on an international level aren’t considered when 
it comes to gap-filling, this would counteract the further process of unifying 
the law in this area. The CISG wouldn’t be up-to-date anymore soon and 
would finally loose its usefulness step by step. 
These thoughts clearly show the need to also observe internationally 
coordinated principles when necessary, although the CISG wasn’t based on 
them initially. 
But again it has to be emphasized that the use of general principles to be 
found outside the Convention depends on whether or not the principles are 
internationally accepted and have been created in such a manner.130 
Furthermore, this procedure is only admissible as long as there is no conflict 
with the CISG and its general principles. In case of a collision between 
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external and internal principles, priority must be given to the internal 
principles.131 
cc) ‘Unidroit Principles’ and ‘Lando Principles’ 
As seen above, external general principles can be used to fill gaps praeter 
legem found in the CISG under very limited conditions. It is highly 
discussed, whether or not the Unidroit Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts132 (‘Unidroit Principles’) and the Principles of 
European Contract Law133 (‘Lando Principles’) fulfill these criteria and can 
therefore generally be seen as an admissible source of general principles to 
be applied to fill a particular gap at hand. 
The Unidroit Principles have first been published in 1994 and have been 
revised in the meanwhile, ending up in the new edition of the Unidroit 
Principles of 2004. They were drafted under the auspices of Unidroit. The 
legal scholars concerned with the development of the Unidroit Principles 
were mainly the same persons who had been involved in the drafting 
progress in relation to the CISG.134 
The principles themselves have been derived from common features of 
different modern legal systems as well as from important Conventions like 
for example the CISG and other international sets of terms such as the 
Incoterms.135 
Contrary to the CISG, they do not directly constitute a substantive uniform 
law.136 They do also not create an international model law for eg domestic 
legislators, having the possibility to adopt or reject them.137 According to the 
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Preamble of the Unidroit Principles, they pursue three following intentions: 
First of all, they shall serve as an aid for parties to international commercial 
contracts. Secondly, they shall be used to help interpret and fill gaps in 
international uniform law instruments or when applicable law can’t be 
determined. And finally, they may serve as a model to national and 
international legislators. 
Amongst the commentators, two diverging groups of thought can be found 
regarding the admissibility of the Unidroit Principles as a possible source to 
extract general principles to be used to fill gaps in accordance with art 7 (2) 
CISG: 
One group denies the possibility to have recourse to the Unidroit Principles 
when filling gaps within the CISG. They bring forward the argument that 
already the fact that the Unidroit Principles have been adopted later than the 
CISG shows that they cannot have any impact on the latter.138 Also, the 
wording of art 7 (2) CISG seems to leave no place to allow this process.139 
This understanding neglects the possibility that the CISG can easily be based 
on a general principle contained in the Unidroit Principles due to the fact that 
both documents have – as we’ve seen above – a similar origin. It is not by 
hazard that the Unidroit Principles vastly correspond to the provisions of the 
CISG as well as to general principles to be extracted from it.140 Furthermore, 
they pursue the same purpose, namely to unify the law. 
The other group – which I am part of – affirms the Unidroit Principles as 
being an admissible source to fill gaps found in the CISG.141 However, this 
doesn’t mean that the Unidroit Principles can be used for a gap-filling 
purpose without any limitations. Still, the particular provision of the Unidroit 
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Principles must be an expression of a general principle on which the CISG is 
based.142 
The same applies to the Lando Principles as they also constitute an ‘excellent 
evidence’ of an internationally accepted solution.143  
However, it must be noted that when the Lando Principles differ from the 
Unidroit Principles on a particular issue, the latter should be given priority 
due to the fact that they were conceived for international contracts.144  
dd) Ways of extracting general principles from the CISG 
In general, there are four generally accepted ways of extracting general 
principles from a Uniform Law Convention like for example the CISG:145 
The most self-evident way is of course to look for provisions explicitly 
claiming their general applicability to the Convention either because of their 
wording or because of their systematic position within the Convention.146 It 
is arguable that these principles don’t constitute general principles 
contemplated in art 7 (2) CISG due to the fact that some commentators have 
defined the latter as principles hidden in the law and therefore not expressly 
mentioned.147 From my point of view, this definition is not backed by the 
wording of art 7 (2) CISG. The words ‘on which it is based’ do not exclude 
expressly stated principles. In fact, the more general principles are expressly 
stated in CISG, the higher is the legal certainty and consequently also the 
uniform application of the CISG. The prevailing view amongst the authors 
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accepts such principles to be part of the general principles contemplated in 
art 7 (2) CISG.148 
Next way to derive general principles from the CISG is to locate common 
thoughts in several provisions of the Convention.149 It is thereby necessary 
that these thoughts appear in more than one provision in order to differentiate 
between simple rules to be applied to a specific situation and those thoughts 
which underlie several provisions and can therefore be generalised.  
However, it is sometimes also possible that a legal thought is subject to 
generalisation although it appears only in a single provision of the 
Convention.150  
Finally, general principles can be derived from the overall context of the 
Convention without being expressed anywhere in its provisions. They are to 
be assumed implicitly like for example the principle ‘pacta sunt servanda’ 
which becomes indirectly apparent out of the narrow conditions under which 
the obligor isn’t obliged to perform, listed in art 79 CISG.151 
c) Reference to domestic law as the last exit 
After having unsuccessfully tried to fill a gap praeter legem by analogy and then 
by having recourse to the general principles of the CISG, art 7 (2) CISG 
contemplates the possibility of gap-filling ‘in conformity with the law applicable 
by virtue of the rules of private international law’.  
Although the possibility to have recourse to domestic law constitutes a huge 
danger to the main goal of the CISG to achieve and sustain a uniform application 
of the CISG, the wording of art 7 (2) CISG unmistakably opens the door for a 
homeward trend. Also a restrictive interpretative approach in respect of this 
paragraph, having in mind the principles of interpretation, especially the need to 
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promote uniformity in the Convention’s application, isn’t able to completely 
disallow gap-filling by means of domestic law.152 However, recourse to the 
applicable national law must be avoided to the largest possible extent and is 
therefore to be seen as an ultima ratio, if the other gap-filling methods remain 
unsuccessful.153 In this case however, one is not only allowed to fill the particular 
gap by virtue of the applicable national law but is obliged to do so.154  
 
VI. LIST OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
After having investigated the gap-filling methodology of the CISG with its three main 
steps analogy, general principles and domestic law – to be observed in this order –, I 
want to try to give a brief overview over the general principles, which are discussed by 
the authors or by jurisprudence. The list will consist of general principles in terms of art 
7 (2) CISG, which can be divided into four different categories: General principles– 
(1) expressly stated in the Convention (part 1.); 
(2) derived from the need to observe good faith (part 2.); 
(3) derived from other provisions of the Convention (part 3.); 
(4) to be found outside the Convention (part 5.). 
In between, I will discuss some rules, which are sometimes seen as constituting general 
principles but fail to do so from my perspective (part 4.). 
The purpose of identifying the general principles on which the CISG is based is in the 
first place to restrict the use of domestic law.  
However, it must be pointed out that the value of the following list of general principles 
must not be overrated. First, the following passage mustn’t be seen as a complete listing 
of all existing and generally accepted general principles due to the massive accumulation 
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of jurisprudence and commentaries to this issue since the CISG was brought into force. 
Secondly, the use of the general principles outlined below can’t be generalised. It always 
remains a question of the specific matter and the gap related thereto, whether or not one 
of these general principles can be applied to fill that particular gap.155 
Thus, by giving an overview of the actual state of affairs in respect of the existing 
general principles on which the CISG is based, the more ambitious goal – the promotion 
of the uniform application of the Convention – is not automatically achieved. A common 
understanding of the existing general principles can only be seen as a first step in this 
direction. 
1.  General Principles expressly stated in the CISG 
Although the CISG doesn’t provide an exhaustive list of all general principles on 
which it is based, a few of them are – more or less clearly – expressly stated within 
the CISG. 
a) Principle of party autonomy, art 6 CISG 
The first general principle I would like to mention is the one of party autonomy 
or – in other words – the principle of the priority of the parties’ intention, 
enshrined in art 6 CISG. 
Already embodied in ULIS, this general principle is also generally recognised in 
relation to the CISG and is at the same time seen as the most important general 
principle.156 The reason for the huge importance of the principle of party 
autonomy can be derived from the fact that due to this principle, the parties to the 
contract can decide whether and to what extent the provisions of the CISG shall 
apply to their contractual relationship. Thus, art 6 CISG gives the Convention a 
dispositive character, resulting in a subsidiary role of the Convention in relation 
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to the parties’ intention.157 This also means that the principle of party autonomy 
prevails over other general principles in terms of art 7 (2) CISG.158 
Consequently, the principle of party autonomy is sometimes also called the 
principle of ‘prevalence of party autonomy’.159 
The principle of party autonomy is not only accepted amongst commentators but 
has been applied by courts of different countries as well.160 An express reference 
to the non-mandatory status of the Convention can for example be found in 
Italian jurisprudence.161  
In the decision rendered by the German Landgericht Stendal162 for example, the 
court stated that art 6 CISG, comprising the principle of party autonomy, validly 
allows the parties to a contract to exclude any provisions of the CISG by their 
agreement. 
b) Principle of prevalence of usage, art 9 CISG 
Another general principle, expressly stated in the CISG can be found in art 9 
CISG. It contains the principle of taking into account known and largely 
observed usages or – in other words – the principle of prevalence of usage.163 
Again, the existence of this principle is undisputed.164 It is often also called the 
principle of prevalence of usage.165 
Art 9 CISG is dealing with three different types of situations:166 
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On the one hand, paragraph (1) is concerned with usages to which the parties 
have agreed as well as any practices established between them. 
On the other hand, paragraph (2) sets out that the parties to the contract ‘are 
considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made applicable to their 
contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew or ought to have 
known and which in international trade is widely known to, and regularly 
observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade 
concerned.’ 
The importance of such a provision has to be seen in the fact that no law can 
reflect all existing special patterns, not to forget the need to embody future 
developments as well.167 
The wording of art 9 (2) CISG sets out very strict criteria for the application of 
trade usage in absence of any agreement of the parties. The trade usage must be 
widely known in international trade and regularly be observed so that it can be 
assumed that this pattern of conduct is part of the expectations of the parties in 
dispute.168 In contrast to that, an autonomous interpretation of art 9 (1) CISG 
makes it obvious that usages in terms of this paragraph mustn’t be widely known 
nor internationally accepted.169  
Recapitulating, when the prerequisites enshrined in art 9 CISG are met, the 
specific usage prevails over the Convention.170 
Again, this principle has also been acknowledged by courts.171 
Austrian decisions were confronted with the problem whether ‘Tegernsee172 
usages’ in respect to the cross-border timber trade constitutes a widely known 
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and regularly observed trade usage in terms of art 9 (2) CISG, which was finally 
approved.173 
c) Principle of informality of declarations, art 11 CISG 
Moving further into examining general principles stated in the CISG, one needs 
to discuss art 11 CISG.  
This article is expressly concerned only with the contract of sale, stating that it 
hasn’t got to be concluded or evidenced by writing and is furthermore not subject 
to any other form requirements.174 
Although the scope of application of art 11 CISG is expressly restricted to the 
contract of sale, this article is seen to comprise the general principle that any 
declaration175 may be made without observing requirements as to its form.176 
This opinion is shared by courts and other tribunals as well.177 
Besides the possibility to modify or terminate a contract of sale in any form,178 it 
was even held that an implied termination of the contract is possible. 
Only the narrowly construed exception of art 96 in conjunction with art 12 CISG 
must be observed,179 according to which a contracting state can make a 
reservation as to the application of art 11 CISG. However, this exception applies 
only to the conclusion of the contract of sale and its evidence.180 
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2. The need for the observance of good faith, art 7 (1) CISG 
As already seen above, art 7 CISG contains a notion of good faith. Other express 
references to the need for the observance of good faith are not existent. 
After having discussed the notion of ‘good faith’ as an instrument of interpretation of 
the Convention,181 I will now have a closer look on its role in respect to art 7 (2) 
CISG and the general principles on which it is based. 
a) ‘Good faith’ as a general principle of the CISG  
According to the wording of art 7 (1) CISG182, good faith in international trade 
has to be observed only in relation to the interpretation of the CISG. 
Consequently, it is questionable whether the observance of good faith also 
constitutes a general principle in terms of art 7 (2) CISG. 
To start with, the drafting history of the Convention regarding the role of the 
notion of good faith in the CISG should be looked at.   
There from, it gets apparent that the delegates concerned with the drafting 
process were divided on this issue.183 Art 7 (1) constitutes a compromise between 
one group of delegates supporting a general rule directly imposing a duty on the 
parties to act in ‘good faith’ and another, opposing any reference to the principle 
of good faith in the Convention184, arguing that this would lead to uncertainty 
due to the absence of a fixed meaning of the term ‘good faith’.185  
The compromise, enshrined in art 7 (1) CISG, finally restricted the principle of 
good faith to an instrument of interpretation. 
But does this mean that good faith must be seen as a mere principle of 
interpretation and not more? An interpretative approach is necessary to solve this 
dilemma. 
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There are two different views adopted amongst scholars on this issue: 
One group strictly sticks to the literal meaning of art 7 (1) CISG, i.e., they 
believe that good faith is only another criterion for judges and arbitrators to 
interpret the Convention’s provisions.186 Not only the wording of art 7 (1) CISG, 
but also its drafting history seems to speak to their favour.187 
On the other hand, there is another group supporting a broad interpretation of art 
7 (1) CISG. They believe that good faith is not only an instrument for the 
interpretation of the Convention but addresses also the parties to the contract and 
the interpretation of their agreement. Mainly, they argue that the fact that there 
are several provisions throughout the CISG constituting a particular application 
of the general principle of good faith.188 Examples therefore are art 16 (2) (b), 21 
(2), 29 (2), 37, 40, 48, 49 (2), 64 (2), 82, 85 and 88 of the Convention.189 
Additionally, Peter Schlechtriem refers to the notion of reasonableness contained 
in several provisions of the CISG, such as expectations of ‘reasonable’ partners 
(art 8 (2) CISG), the ‘reasonable reliance’ (art 16 (2) (b) CISG) and a ‘reasonable 
period of time’ (art 39 (1) CISG).190 For some authors, the existence of these 
references to the reasonableness standard ‘inherently requires the application of 
good faith to the conduct of the parties’.191  
In the end, the latter view can be seen as prevailing.192 
I also argue in favour of the latter view according to which good faith is also a 
general principle in terms of art 7 (2) CISG. From my perspective, the pervasive 
existence of the notion of good faith in respect of a party’s behaviour makes 
another perception unsustainable. 
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Also the jurisprudence seems to prefer the latter perception of the role of good 
faith in the CISG.193 
b) Aspects of the general principle of good faith 
Now that we have affirmed the role of good faith as a general principle of the 
CISG it is necessary to identify its content. Without any closer specification of 
this vague concept of good faith, the general principle of good faith wouldn’t be 
of great help for the decision making process of judges.194 The latter general 
principle would remain an inoperable tool.  
In consequence, more detailed principles have to be extracted from the notion of 
good faith in order to obtain a helpful tool. There is however no clear-cut 
distinction between additional principles and aspects of good faith amongst 
commentators again due to the inherent vagueness of the term. This rather 
theoretical problem should not be overrated. The categorization of a principle as 
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http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950524g1.html]; ICC Court of Arbitration, case No. 8128/1995 of 17 
November 1995, available online at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/958128i1.html; Hungary: Court of 
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being part of good faith or as a self-contained general principle is of no real 
relevance in practice. 
Bearing this problem in mind, the general principle of good faith contains at least 
the following aspects: 
aa) Principle of reasonableness 
As seen above, the basis for the general principle of good faith should be – 
amongst others – the many provisions of the CISG referring to the reasonable 
standard.195 Consequently, it is logical to examine the existence of a principle 
of reasonableness being part of the general principle of good faith.196 
However, this is not done continuously by all commentators. Some believe 
the principle of reasonableness to be a principle of its own.197 The little 
importance of these diverging views has already been mentioned. 
Irrespective of this classification, there is a common understanding that these 
references to the standard of reasonableness constitute a general principle 
according to which the parties to a contract have to conduct themselves in 
accordance to the standard of the reasonable person.198  
These references to the standard of reasonableness can be categorized into 
two different groups:  
There are several references within the CISG which directly address the 
parties to the contract as subjects with the qualities of a ‘reasonable 
person’.199  
The other group of references demands the parties to perform a particular 
action within a ‘reasonable’ period of time.200 
                                                 
195 In total 38 references to the reasonableness standard in the CISG 
196 See Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 7, para 30 in note 50; Koneru ‘The International 
Interpretation’, part III. A. 
197 See for example Felemegas ‘Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation’, p. 287; Magnus ‘General 
Principles’, part 5. b) (5) 
198 See for example Felemegas ‘Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation’, p. 287-288; Schlechtriem 
Kommentar (2000), art 7, para 53 
199 See for example art 8 (2), 25, 35 (2) (b), 60 (a), 79 (1), 85, 86 (1), 88 (2) CISG  
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Irrespective whether the notion of reasonableness refers to, for example, time 
limits or a party’s conduct, art 8 CISG has to be applied in order to interpret 
the parties conduct.  
Paragraph (1) of art 8 CISG states that primarily a party’s conduct has to be 
interpreted according to its intent as long as the other party knew or could not 
have been unaware of that intent. However, the importance of this rule in 
practice is not very significant, because of its inherent problems to prove the 
parties’ intentions.201  
Consequently, most interpretative problems will be solved by applying 
paragraph (2), stipulating the general rule that an objective standard based on 
the view of a reasonable person in the same situation has to be applied.202 
Thereby, it is ensured that a good commercial practice of international trade 
is observed.  
This means that although a party’s conduct has to be interpreted primarily in 
accordance with its intent (art 8 (1) CISG), most cases will be resolved by 
applying art 8 (2) CISG and its reasonableness standard. 
These findings clearly show that the assumption of some legal scholars that 
the principle that a party’s conduct is to be interpreted primarily according to 
its objective meaning is expressed in art 8 (1) CISG,203 is wrong.     
By the way, the rule embodied in art 8 (2) CISG is restricted to the extent that 
noticeable relevant circumstances in terms of art 8 (3) CISG or an 
international usage in accordance with art 9 CISG prevail in the particular 
case.204 
Even though there is this widespread recognition of the principle of 
reasonableness, it is still not certain what kind of reasonableness one must 
                                                                                                                                                
200 See for example art 18 (2), 33 (c) , 39 (1), 43 (1), 47 (1), 49 (2) (a), 63 (1), 64 (2) (b), 65 (1), 65 (2), 75 
CISG 
201 See Honnold ‘Uniform Law for International Sales’, p. 117 
202 See Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (5) 
203 See for example Schlechtriem Commentary (1998), art. 7, para 38 
204 See supra note 202 
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take into account in order to meet the necessary standards.205 While solving 
this problem the international character of the Convention has to be borne in 
mind. As a consequence, only internationally accepted standards can be of 
relevance. If courts would apply standards recognized in a restricted area 
only, the goal of a uniform application of the Convention would again be 
endangered. 
bb) ‘Venire contra factum proprium’ – ‘estoppel’ 
A first aspect of good faith can be seen in the – amongst lawyers from civil 
law countries – well known Latin phrase ‘venire contra factum proprium’.206 
The pendant to this phrase in countries based on a common law system is the 
principle of ‘estoppel’.207  
While the Latin phrase, used in civil law systems, gives immediate 
indications as to the meaning of it (translated into English, ‘venire contra 
factum proprium’ merely means ‘actions contrary to prior conduct’), the 
principle of estoppel needs further explanations. 
The reliance based estoppel as the only type of estoppels relevant in 
connection with the CISG,208 was defined by Judge Lord Denning as follows: 
‘[W]hen a man, by his words or conduct, has led another to believe in a 
particular state of affairs, he will not be allowed to go back on it when it 
would be unjust or inequitable for him to do so.’209  
Recapitulating, both approaches constitute a principle prohibiting actions of a 
party to the contract of sale contrary to its prior conduct.  
However, estoppel in contrast to the prohibition of venire contra factum 
proprium further demands a reliance situation. That’s why authors with a 
                                                 
205 See Felemegas ‘Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation’, p. 288  
206 See for example Schlechtriem Commentary (1998), art 7, para 37; Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. 
b) (3) 
207 See Ferrari ‘Gap-filling’, p. 83  
208 Four categories of estoppels in English/American Law: estoppel by record, estoppel by deed, reliance-
based estoppels and laches (for more details, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estoppel#Definition) 
209 See Moorgate Mercantile v Twitchings [1976] 1 QB 225, CA at 241 
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civil law background use the term ‘reliance protection’ instead of estoppel 
and simultaneously admit that the demarcation line between both approaches 
is blurred.210  
Consequently, it has to be distinguished between these two (slightly) 
different principles when filling gaps in accordance with art 7 (2) CISG. 
However, they can both be extracted from more or less the same provisions 
of the CISG:   
Art 16(2) (b) CISG, establishing the irrevocability of an offer in case the 
offeror has created a situation of reliance, as well as art 50 2nd sentence 
CISG, dealing with the loss of the buyer’s right to claim price reduction 
because of an unjustifiable rejection of cure by the seller, can be seen as 
provisions, from which the principle prohibiting actions contrary to prior 
conduct is to be deduced.211 Furthermore, also art 80 CISG, showing more 
generally that a party may not take advantage of the failure of the other party, 
caused by the first party, is seen to be a source of this legal thought. 212 
As to the estoppel principle or the principle of reliance protection, 
additionally to art 16 (2) (b) CISG, the provisions dealing with the buyer’s 
possibility to rely on the seller’s special skills (art 35(2)(b) CISG) and the 
exclusion of any liability for title defects in case the seller has manufactured 
the goods in accordance with the buyer’s specifications (art 42(2)(b) CISG) 
can be seen as examples proving the existence of such an inherent general 
principle.213 
These examples show that the Convention is based on both concepts which 
can consequently be applied to similar situations. 
There are nevertheless voices amongst commentators as well as courts, who 
deny that this thought is part of the general principles in terms of art 7 (2) 
                                                 
210 See Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (4) 
211 See Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (3) 
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CISG.214 One court for example argued that estoppel is a matter not governed 
by the CISG and must therefore be resolved according to domestic law rather 
than general principles of the CISG.215 
This decision is opposed by a wide range of case-law, regarding the principle 
of estoppel as a manifestation of the principle of good faith.216 
From my perspective, opinions denying the prohibition of actions contrary to 
prior conduct as being one of the general principles on which the Convention 
is based, neglect the existence of this thought in several provisions of the 
CISG and is therefore not to be supported. 
cc) Prohibition of the misuse of rights 
Another aspect of good faith is certainly the prohibition of the misuse of 
rights.217 Besides art 80 CISG, there is also art 29 (2) 2nd sentence CISG 
which can be seen as containing an expression of this principle. While art 80 
CISG restricts the exertion of legal rights arising from the failure of the other 
party to perform, in case such failure was caused by the first party, ‘art 29 (2) 
2nd sentence CISG prohibits the abuse of a formal legal position’.218  
There is no case law to this principle on the CISG. Although there exists a 
decision acknowledging the existence of this principle in relation to ULIS – 
the predecessor of the CISG – this judgment is of little help. Since the gap-
filling approaches embodied in the CISG on the one hand and in ULIS on the 
other hand are different from each other (no recourse to domestic law in 
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215 See Netherlands: Arrondissementsrechtbank [District Court] Amsterdam 5 October 1994, available 
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ULIS; see above in Chapter II., 2.), the case-law on ULIS can only be used to 
a limited extent.219 
 
As said above, there are several other issues which could further be classified as 
aspects of the principle of good faith.220 I decided to name only those aspects, 
which are widely accepted as being part of good faith. Other aspects, lying in the 
grey zone between good faith and independent general principles, will be 
discussed in part 3. of this chapter.  
c) Issues outside the principle of good faith 
In contrast to that, there are at the same time aspects which can neither be 
categorized as being an aspect of good faith nor be seen as a self-contained 
general principle. 
These issues are to be discussed in the following passage.  
aa) Acting as a prudent businessman 
Some scholars believe that the principle of good faith also establishes a duty 
of the parties to the contract of sale to act in conformity with the standards of 
a prudent businessman in international trade.221 
From my point of view, the existence of such a principle should be denied.222 
First of all, it is much too unspecific in order to be of great help in promoting 
a uniform application of the CISG. What standards are decisive in order to 
decide what amounts to be in conformity of a prudent businessman? The 
applicants of the CISG would be pushed towards their national standards to 
try and fill this lack of specification. 
                                                 
219 See Schlechtriem Commentary (1998), art 7, para 39 
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Secondly, art 9 (2) CISG and its inherent principle of taking into account 
known and largely observed usages223 also establishes standards for the 
conduct of the parties. To the extent that there is an internationally known 
usage of how a businessman has to behave, it has to be taken into account by 
virtue of art 9 CISG.  
Recapitulating, the principle to act in conformity of a prudent businessman is 
not only incompatible in respect of the goal of a uniform application of the 
Convention but also in relation to art 9 CISG and its standards under which a 
parties’ conduct must be of a specific nature. 
bb) Additional obligations of a positive character 
Finally, the issue of imposing on the contract parties additional obligations of 
a positive nature has to be mentioned in general. 
There are some voices in the academic literature, who argue in favour of the 
possibility to extract positive obligations from the notion of good faith such 
as for example acting in accordance with good faith in the bargaining and 
formation process.224  
From my perspective, the extraction of additional obligations based on good 
faith must be rejected, without questioning the role of good faith as a general 
principle in terms of art 7 (2) CISG.225 Only in relation to obligations already 
embodied in text of the Convention itself, the principle of good faith sets out 
standards for their performance. 
3. Principles to be deduced from other provisions of the CISG 
Now that general principles expressly stated in the Convention as well as those to be 
derived from the need to observe good faith in international trade have been 
discussed, I will go on with the third group of general principles to be deduced from 
other provisions of the CISG. 
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a) Pacta sunt servanda 
The first general principle I want to mention is the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda, i.e. the principle that the contract is binding to the parties. 
Although this basic rule isn’t expressly mentioned in the CISG, it is evident that 
it is of existence.226 This can be derived from several provisions of the CISG like 
for example art 30 and art 53 CISG, embodying the duty to deliver and the duty 
to effect payment.227 
Furthermore, the art 71-73 and 79 CISG, containing narrowly construed 
circumstances under which the contract can be avoided, wouldn’t make sense 
without the basic rule that the parties are bound to their contractual agreement.228 
The fact that the parties, due to art 6 CISG, have the possibility to derogate from 
the just mentioned provisions doesn’t influence this result. It rather enforces the 
rule that the contract, reflecting the parties’ will, should be enforced to the most 
possible extent.229  
b) Favor contractus principle 
Another widely recognized general principle, to be derived from several 
provisions of the Convention, is the favor contractus principle.230 This doesn’t 
merely reflect the fact that once the parties have agreed upon a contract of sale, 
they are bound by it and are in general obliged to perform their duties arising out 
of it. Rather, this is the result of the CISG giving special weight to the existence 
of the contract of sale. Whenever possible, the contract must be upheld. Solutions 
in favor of the contract must be given priority over the premature termination of 
it on the initiative of one of the parties.231  
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The fact that a premature termination of the contract has to be seen as the last 
resort is an important issue for the creation of a positive environment in respect 
of the functioning of international trade as a whole. Every tradesperson, 
especially in international trade, requires a certain degree of certainty in relation 
to the other party’s compliance with the contract terms in order to be able to do a 
proper business. As a consequence, I believe that the CISG wouldn’t have had 
such a great success without embodying this general principle. 
There are several provisions reflecting the idea of upholding the contract to the 
furthest possible extent. 
The provisions dealing with contract avoidance are certainly the most evident 
source. First of all, according to art 49 (1) (a), 64 (1) (a) and 72 (1) CISG, a party 
may declare the contract avoided only if the other party’s breach of contract 
amounts to be fundamental as defined in art 25 CISG. Other circumstances under 
which the art 49 and 64 CISG permits the avoidance of a contract are similarly 
narrowly construed. Art 49 (1) (b) in conjunction with art 47 (1) CISG in case of 
non-delivery as well as art 64 (1) (b) in conjunction with art 63 (1) CISG in case 
of failure to pay or to take delivery of the goods demand that an additional period 
of time has to be fixed to give the party in breach a further possibility to perform 
its obligations. Furthermore, art 51 (1) CISG restricts these rights to parts of the 
contract only. Finally, also art 26 and 48 CISG can be mentioned in order to 
prove the existence of such a general principle. 
The general principle of upholding the contract is also recognised in the 
jurisprudence. One court expressly referred to this principle by stating that ‘the 
CISG establishes the preference of the preservation of the contract: in case of 
doubt, the contract shall also be preserved in case of disturbances, while the 
avoidance of the contract shall be exceptionary’.232 Another decision is known 
emphasizing contract avoidance as an ultima ratio remedy.233 
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c) Principle of loyalty 
A Helsinki Court of Appeals dealt with the importance of continuation of the 
sales contract within another principle, confirmed as one of the principles on 
which the Convention is based: the principle of loyalty.234 
This principle is also recognised amongst commentators235 and barely means 
‘that a party cannot take a completely singular view of its own interest to the 
exclusion of the other, having in some circumstances to take account of those of 
the other party.’236 In essence, both parties owe one another the duty to act in 
favor of the preservation of the contract.237 There from, the above mentioned 
court assumed an implied duty to continue a sales relationship beyond the 
particular individual sales contract. The case was about a seller who abruptly 
ended its trade relationship with the buyer. The court decided that after the 
parties had done business for two years, the buyer's ‘operations cannot be based 
on a risk of an abrupt ending of a contract.’238 As a consequence, the seller 
wasn’t able to stop delivering goods to the buyer despite the absence of any 
contract being in place between the parties, because, from the perspective of the 
court, the buyer had ‘obtained de facto exclusive selling rights’.239  
d) Principle of co-operation 
Another widely accepted general principle, closely related to the general 
principle of good faith,240 is the principle of co-operation. 
Although the Supreme Court of Germany held that the general principle of good 
faith leads to the duty of the parties to cooperate with, the general principle of 
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co-operation is mostly seen as a principle on its own,241 only closely related to 
good faith. 
It can be deduced from several ancillary duties provided in the Convention in 
addition to the main obligation of the parties to perform.242 Mainly, one has to 
mention the buyer’s duty to accept cure by the seller, enshrined in art 34, 37, 48 
CISG, the duty of a party to mitigate the loss of the other party (art 77 CISG) and 
the duty to preserve goods to be returned as set out in art 85, 86 CISG.243 
These ancillary duties of the parties allow the conclusion that the Convention 
expresses the general principle that both parties are held to enable the other party 
to perform and not to hinder the sales transaction.244  
It is however argued whether this general principle also includes a general duty 
to communicate information needed by the other party. Although the majority of 
the scholars argue in favor of such a duty,245 there are also critical voices.246  The 
fact that the provisions of the CISG embody many duties to notify – directly or 
indirectly – the other party, doesn’t solve this discussion. On the one hand, there 
are scholars, doubting the existence of a general duty to communicate 
information needed by the other party precisely because of this fact. They feel 
reluctant because each single duty of the Convention to notify the other party is 
regulated in great detail.247 On the other hand, one has to bear in mind that the 
draftsmen of the CISG couldn’t foresee all possible circumstances under which a 
duty to notify the other party is required.248 
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I believe that the acceptance of a general duty to communicate information 
needed by the other party is not contrary but rather predetermined by several 
duties within the CISG to notify the other party. 
The decision of the German Supreme Court supports this view, referring to the 
‘general obligations of cooperation and information of the parties’.249 
e) Principle of fair trading 
Another general principle of the CISG, which is sometimes discussed as one of 
the variants of the general principle of good faith,250 is the principle of fair 
trading.251  
This principle is mainly derived from art 40 CISG, stating that the seller loses the 
right to rely on certain legal positions in case of a lack of conformity of the 
goods, which he didn’t disclose although he was aware of or could not have been 
unaware of the discrepancy. 
References to the principle of fair trading can mostly be found in the 
jurisprudence. It was for example held by an arbitration tribunal that ‘[a]rticle 40 
is an expression of the principles of fair trading that underlie also many other 
provisions of the Convention, and it is by its very nature a codification of a 
general principle’.252 The tribunal asserted that even if art 40 CISG does not 
directly apply to an unconformity under a particular contractual warranty clause, 
the principle of fair trading, embodied in art 40 CISG, is to be indirectly applied 
to this situation by virtue of art 7 (2) CISG.253 
Another court decision argued that, due to the principle embodied in art 40 
CISG, a negligently acting buyer deserves more protection than a seller 
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committing fraud.254 In consequence of this allegation, the court decided that the 
seller’s liability wasn’t excluded in accordance with art 35 (3) CISG because of 
the latter having misrepresented the age and the mileage of a car, although the 
buyer couldn’t have been unaware of the lack of conformity.255  
f) Imputation of third party’s conduct and knowledge 
Having a closer look on the liability of the parties to the contract of sale, it is 
important to investigate their responsibility for a third party’s conduct or 
knowledge. 
It is for example unclear whether a declaration has been received by a party of 
the contract delivered to an employee of this party or whether the knowledge of a 
person acting on behalf of a party eg in relation to the lack of conformity of the 
goods has to be imputed to this party.256 
To decide on this questions, art 79 (1) and (2) CISG is of great value.  
Paragraph (2) of this provision embodies the rule that a party is liable for the 
conduct of an independent third party257 engaged for the performance of the 
contract, unless one of the exemptions of art 79 (2) CISG is fulfilled. 
Additionally, art 79 (1) CISG contemplates a party’s liability for the conduct of 
its own people, assisting the performance of the contract. 
It is accepted that these rules embodied in art 79 (1) and (2) CISG allow the 
conclusion that the Convention is based on the general principle that a party to 
the contract is liable for the conduct and knowledge of its own people as well as 
such third persons whom the party uses to carry out the contract.258 
                                                 
254 See CLOUT case No. 168 [Germany: Oberlandesgericht [Appellate Court] Köln 21 May 1996, 
available online at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960521g1.html]; Ferrari ‘Gap-filling’, p. 89 
255 See supra note 254 as well as Ferrari ‘Gap-filling’, p. 89 
256 See Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (22) 
257 It has to be distinguished between an independent third party under art 79 (2) CISG and a person for 
whom the party is absolutely responsible, being part of his personnel risk in terms of art 79 (1); see 
therefor Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 79, para 25-29 
258 See Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (22); Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 79, para 29 
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By the way, it must be noted that the imputation of a third person’s action which 
constitutes a legal transaction is an issue governed by the applicable domestic 
law dealing with agency matters.259 
g) Principle of full compensation 
The next issue which is important to be discussed thoroughly because of its 
several disputed aspects, is about the compensation of damages suffered by one 
party in consequence of the wrongdoing of the other party. 
aa) General overview 
In the art 45 (1) and 61 (1) (b) CISG, the Convention orders that if a party is 
in breach of any obligation under the particular contract or contained in the 
Convention, the other party is entitled to claim damages. From art 74 to 76, 
78, 84, 85, 86, 88 (3) CISG, it gets obvious that the CISG contains the 
concept of full compensation of the incurred damages. This liability of the 
party in breach is only excluded by the different scenarios contemplated in 
art 79 CISG. 
It is widely recognized that these facts allow the assumption that the CISG is 
based on a general principle of full compensation260 to be applied even in 
relation to the breach of ‘additionally stipulated or implied further 
obligations’.261 
The principle of full compensation also applies to consequential damages, 
unless art 74 2nd sentence CISG, embodying a restricted recoverability 
limited to foreseeable damages only, applies.262  
The principle of full compensation is not only accepted amongst legal 
scholars but has also been positively documented in the jurisprudence.263 One 
                                                 
259 See Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (22) 
260 See Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (12); Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 7, para 30; 
Ferrari ‘Gap-filling’, p. 85 
261 See Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (12) 
262 See Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 7, para 30 
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court however restricted the applicability of this principle to cases where the 
contract of sale has been declared avoided by one of the parties. Under this 
premise, the court held that the CISG ‘follows the principle of damages equal 
to the loss suffered’ contemplated in art 74 CISG.264 In the absence of such a 
declaration, ‘the calculation of damages under [a]rt 74 CISG can be based 
only on maintenance and performance of the contract’.265 This restrictive 
interpretation of art 74 CISG is evidently contrary to the wording of this 
provision. There is no indication why art 74 CISG stating that damages 
‘consist of a sum equal to the loss’ shall not apply without restrictions when 
the contract hasn’t been declared avoided. Also a systematic interpretation 
discloses no evidence therefor. 
bb) Payment of interest 
After having ascertained the principle of full compensation as a general 
principle in terms of art 7 (2) CISG, it is necessary to specify its relationship 
to the issue of payment of interest. 
There are mainly three questions surrounding this issue, which I will discuss 
in the following passage: 
(1) First of all, it is controversially discussed whether the fact that a party is 
entitled to interest on a sum, which the other party has failed to pay 
constitutes a general principle on its own or is part of the more general 
principle of full compensation.  
I believe that it can’t be seen as general principle on its own.266 The 
obligation to pay interest on any sum in arrears, merely a repetition of 
                                                                                                                                                
263 See for example Austria: Oberster Gerichtshof [Supreme Court] 9 March 2000, available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000309a3.html; CLOUT cases Nos. 93 [Austria: Vienna Arbitration 
Award, case No. SCH-4366 of 15 June 1994; available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940615a3.html] and No. 94 [Austria: Vienna Arbitration Award, case 
No. SCH-4318 of 15 June 1994; available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940615a4.html] 
264 See Austria: Oberster Gerichtshof [Supreme Court] 9 March 2000, available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000309a3.html 
265 See supra note 264 
266 See for the opposite opinion for example Schlechtriem Kommentar (2000), art 7, para 52; Ferrari ‘Gap-
filling’, p. 88 
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art 78 CISG, is too specific in order to be applied on a wider scale. As a 
consequence, the obligation doesn’t meet the necessary standard to be a 
general principle in terms of art 7 (2) CISG on its own. It is one aspect 
of the principle of full compensation as the principle, underlying the 
buyer’s and seller’s remedies.  
This opinion is supported by authors267 as well as by the 
jurisprudence.268 
(2) Besides the categorization of the obligation to pay interest on sums in 
arrears, it must be discussed according to which rules the point of 
accrual of interest is to be determined. 
There are mainly two diverging opinions on this specific issue.  
One group of thought believes that interest is to be paid from the date 
the payment was due without requiring any formal notice to the debtor 
in default.  
This view, shared by various legal scholars269 and courts270, is opposed 
by another group of thought, demanding a formal notice to the debtor 
before one is entitled to interest.271 
From my perspective, the former point-of-view stating that interest is to 
be paid from the date the payment is due without requiring a formal 
notice to the debtor is preferable.  
                                                 
267 See Felemegas ‘Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation’, p. 285 in footnote 646 
268 See for example CLOUT Case No. 94 [Austria: Vienna Arbitration Award, case No. SCH-4318 of 15 
June 1994, available online at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940615a4.html] 
269 See for example Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (25); Koneru ‘The International 
Interpretation’, part II. B. 
270 See CLOUT case No. 217 [Switzerland: Handelsgericht [Commercial Court] Aargau 26 September 
1997, available online at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970926s1.html]; CLOUT case No. 80 
[Germany: Kammergericht [Appellate Court] Berlin 24 January 1994, available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940124g1.html]; CLOUT case No. 56 [ Switzerland: Pretore della 
giurisdizione [District Court] Locarno Campagna 27 April 1992, available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/920427s1.html] 
271 This view was for example expressed in Bulgaria: Arbitration Award case No. 11/1996 of 12 February 
1998, available online at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980212bu.html; Germany: Landgericht [District 
Court ] Zwickau 19 March 1999, available online at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990319g1.html 
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On the one hand, this concept gets obvious out of art 84 (1) CISG 
dealing with the payment of interest on the price to be refunded by the 
seller. Interest is to be paid starting from the date on which the price 
was paid. A formal notice to the seller isn’t necessary. 
On the other hand, this view complies with the idea of full 
compensation, on which – as we have just seen – the CISG is based. 
Concerning the issue in dispute, the application of this idea means that 
the debtor in failure to pay must bear the creditor’s loss from the date, 
the payment was due.272 Due payment would have meant interest on the 
sum from this day on. Consequently, the creditor’s loss of interest must 
be borne by the debtor.  
(3) Finally, the most controversially discussed issue concerning the 
payment of interest is how to determine the rate of interest payable. 
Both art 78 and 84 CISG don’t provide any express regulation in this 
respect.  
Hence, the starting point of all discussions must be to determine, 
whether the issue of the rate of interest constitutes a gap praeter legem, 
to be solved in accordance with art 7 (2) CISG or a gap intra legem, to 
be resolved by having recourse to the applicable national law.273 The 
question whether or not the rate of interest is a matter governed by the 
CISG, is decisive therefore. 
The legislative history of the rule eventually adopted in art 78 CISG 
could be helpful to find an answer to this problem. It shows that the 
delegates were unable to agree on a specific rate to be incorporated in 
the Convention and finally agreed on a compromise, set out in art 78 
CISG.274 
                                                 
272 See for the same opinion Koneru ‘The International Interpretation’, part II. B.  
273 See for this problem of categorisation Chapter V. 1. on p. 20 of this dissertation 
274 See for example Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 78, para 2; Koneru ‘The International 
Interpretation’, part II. A. 
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There are some who believe that, due to the fact that the Conference 
deliberately omitted a rule on the rate of interest, the issue is not 
governed by the Convention requiring the gap intra legem to be filled 
with the applicable national law.275 
However, there is another group classifying the gap as a gap praeter 
legem and therefore allowing the recourse to general principle in terms 
of art 7 (2) CISG.276 Such an approach for the solution of the problem 
of determining the rate of interest is of course desirable under the aspect 
of the uniformity of the application of the Convention. Mainly, they 
believe that the payment of interest is a matter governed by the CISG. 
Only the method how the rate of interest is to be fixed is not expressly 
mentioned.277 Another argument is that the wording of art 78 CISG 
nowhere expressly orders that the interest rate is an issue to be resolved 
by the applicable domestic law.278    
I believe that – bearing in mind the ultimate goal of uniformity – it is 
wise to follow the second opinion. The fact that the delegates couldn’t 
agree on a method to determine the applicable rate doesn’t necessarily 
mean that they wanted this issue to be governed by domestic law. The 
arguments supporting a uniform approach prevail over those supporting 
the other view. 
But, even the supporters of a uniform approach do not agree on how the 
interest rate should be determined. 
The following passage shall only give a brief overview of the existing 
proposals.  
Some believe that the rate of interest shall be determined in accordance 
with the loss suffered by the creditor because of the debtor’s failure to 
                                                 
275 See references to scholars as well as case law in Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 78, para 27, 
footnote 25  
276 See Koneru ‘The International Interpretation’, part II. A.; Mather ‘Choice of Law’, p. 155 
277 See Koneru ‘The International Interpretation’, part II. A. 
278 See Schelchtriem Commentary (2005), art 78, para 28 
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pay.279 Others see the compensation for benefits obtained by the debtor 
to be the purpose of art 78 CISG. Consequently, they want the usual 
rate of interest at the debtor’s place of business to be applicable.280 
Other proposals suggested the application of the usual rate of interest at 
the place or performance or an international one, such as for example 
LIBOR.281 Finally, some scholars as well as courts decided to apply the 
Unidroit Principles (art 7.4.9) or the Principles of European Contract 
Law (art 4.507(1), art 9.508 (1)).282 
Bacher correctly points out that – regardless of the exact purpose of art 
78 CISG – it is wrong to allow local circumstances283 to influence the 
rate of interest, because both the debtor as well as the creditor are 
usually not bound to place money or take loans at their place of 
business.284 As a consequence, the prime rate of the currency involved 
seems to be appropriate.285 
I support this view, leading to eg the application of the prime rate of the 
US Federal Reserve, in case payment is to be made in US dollars. 
Being completely detached from local circumstances, this approach is 
in line with the world wide globalization.  
Recapitulating, it is a long way to go before a common understanding 
of how to determine the rate of interest for the purpose of art 78 CISG 
will be achieved. It is however important for the promotion of the goal 
of uniformity to solve the dispute on the basis of uniform law.  
                                                 
279 See Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 78, para 29 
280 See supra note 279 
281 See supra note 279 
282 See Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 78, para 31a 
283 for example by taking the creditor’s or the debtor’s place of business as a criterion to determine the rate 
of interest 
284 See Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 78, para 30 
285 See supra note 284 
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h) Principle of mitigation 
Being closely connected to the principle of full compensation, the art 77, 85 and 
86 CISG are to be seen as the source for the principle of mitigation or – in other 
words – the duty to avoid damages.286 
This principle is also sometimes seen to be an expression of the principle of good 
faith in international trade.287 
Art 77 CISG establishes the general rule that a party relying on a breach of 
contract must take all reasonable measures in order to keep the damages resulting 
from the breach to a minimum.288 This means that a party will not be 
compensated for any avoidable loss, including the loss of profit. 
Additionally, the art 85 and 86 CISG contemplate specific situations in which 
this general rule is to be applied:  
Art 85 CISG establishes the duty of the seller to take all reasonable steps to 
preserve the goods until they have been handed over to the buyer, even if the 
latter is late in taking delivery. 
Art 86 CISG creates a similar duty of the buyer to preserve the goods he has 
received but which he does intend to reject. 
These thoughts allow the conclusion that the CISG is based on the general 
principle of mitigation or the duty to avoid damages to be applied to situations 
not expressly referred to in the Convention. 
An example therefore is that the seller is not only obligated to preserve the 
goods, as contemplated in art 85 CISG, but also to preserve material furnished by 
the buyer.289 
                                                 
286 See for example Felemegas ‘Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation’, p. 288; Magnus ‘General 
Principles’, part 5. b) (10); Honnold ‘Uniform Law for International Sales’, p. 107 
287 See for example Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 77, para 1 
288 See Felemegas ‘Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation’, p. 288; Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) 
(10); Honnold ‘Uniform Law for International Sales’, p. 107; Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 77, 
para 1 
289 See Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (10) 
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The principle of mitigation has also been recognised by courts of different 
jurisdictions.290 A German District Court291 for example held that creditor’s 
expenses for a debt collecting agency were not to be compensated by the debtor. 
It argued that these expenses were unnecessary because the agency had no more 
possibilities to achieve payment than the creditor himself. Accordingly, the 
compensation of these expenses was – correctly – held to be contrary to the 
general duty to avoid damages.  
i) Principle of concurrent performance 
The next principle is concerned with the order in which the parties to a contract 
have to perform their contractual obligations. Indications for the existence of a 
general rule regarding this issue are to be found in the following provisions of 
the Convention: 
First of all, art 58 (1) CISG stipulates the rule that the parties to the contract 
generally have to perform their obligations concurrently. Exemptions there from 
have to be made in case of agreements to the contrary (see art 6 CISG). 
Moreover, art 58 (3) CISG orders the buyer to be obligated to pay the purchase 
price only after having had the possibility to examine the delivered goods. 
Additionally, art 81 (2) 2nd sentence CISG also stipulates concurrent performance 
in case the contract has been declared avoided. 
This evidence within the Convention allows the conclusion that the CISG is 
based on the general principle that none of the parties have to perform first (also 
called principle of do ut des), which has to be applied to any contractual 
                                                 
290 See for example Germany: Landgericht [District Court] Zwickau 19 March 1999, available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990319g1.html; ICC Court of Arbitration case No. 8817 of December 
1997 , available online at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/978817i1.html; Italty: Tribunale [District 
Court] Rimini 26 November 2002, available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021126i3.html.html 
291 See Germany: Landgericht [District Court] Zwickau 19 March 1999, available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990319g1.html 
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obligation.292 Thus, this principle also applies to services additionally to the ones 
contained in the CISG, to which the parties have agreed.   
j) Right of retention 
Closely connected to the principle of concurrent performance, mentioned above, 
another important question occurs when it comes to the question whether a party 
is generally entitled to withhold its performance until the other party has 
performed in accordance with the contractual terms.  
It is disputed whether the provisions of the CISG allow the conclusion that the 
Convention embodies such a general rule. 
The following provisions regulate a right to withhold performance only in 
specific instances: 
To start with, art 58 CISG gives the buyer the right to withhold the payment of 
the purchase price as long as the seller hasn’t delivered the goods in accordance 
with the contract terms and the Convention itself. 
Furthermore, art 71 CISG contemplates a right of retention in relation to the non-
performance of a substantial part of (any of) a party’s obligations. Although the 
scope of art 71 CISG is broader, it only applies in relation to anticipatory 
breaches and not to non-performance or malperformance of obligations already 
due.293 
Also art 81 (2) 2nd sentence provides for a concurrent restitution after avoidance 
of the contract. 
Finally, the CISG contains some special rights to retain in art 85 2nd sentence 
CISG (seller’s right to withhold the goods until he is reimbursed for his expenses 
in order to preserve them) and art 86 (1) CISG (similar right for the buyer in case 
he wants to reject the goods). 
                                                 
292 See for example Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (13) 
293 See Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 7, para 34 
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The majority of writers argue in favour of a general right to withhold to be 
derived from the provisions mentioned above in respect to obligations and claims 
based on a contract, which is governed by the CISG.294 This means that such a 
right exists not only in relation to obligations regulated in the Convention, but 
also in connection with obligations autonomously created by the parties on the 
basis of art 6 CISG.295 
However, it remains the question whether this general right constitutes a defence 
to be raised in court or an objection to be considered ex officio by the court.296 
Although this problem shall not be discussed in this dissertation, it can be said 
that according to Schlechtriem, the right of retention should be treated as a 
defence with retroactive effect.297 
k) Principle to determine place of payment of all monetary obligations 
After having examined general principles in respect to the performance of 
obligations in general, it is necessary to have a closer look at the monetary 
obligations arising in connection with a contract governed by the CISG. In this 
regard it is disputed whether the Convention embodies a general rule to 
determine the place of payment of these obligations. 
Starting point is art 57 (1) (a) CISG and its regulation concerning the place of 
payment in relation to the buyer’s obligation to pay the price. According to this 
paragraph the buyer has to pay the price at the seller’s place of business in 
absence of any agreements to the contrary or in case of doubts. 
The CISG doesn’t regulate the place of performance for other payment 
obligations like for example restitution obligations and payment of damages. 
This gap has to be filled in accordance with art 7 (2) CISG.298  
                                                 
294 See Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 7, para 34 with references to other scholars in footnote 78; 
but see Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (15) 
295 See Schlechtriem ‘Interpretation, gap-filling’, part II. 5. b) aa) 
296 See Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 7, para 34; Schlechtriem ‘Interpretation, gap-filling’, part II. 
5. b) bb)   
297 See supra note 296 
298 See for example Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 57, para 25 
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It is controversially discussed whether from the rule embodied in art 57 (1) (a) 
CISG, it can generally be inferred that in case of doubts the place of performance 
of all other payment obligations is the creditor’s place of business. 
There is much case law and comments of legal scholars available on this issue. 
One court decision denied the possibility to extract a general principle from art 
57 (1) (a) CISG and instead referred to the applicable national law in order to 
determine the place of performance of the obligation to refund the sales price.299 
Some legal scholars supporting this view argue that the rule enshrined in art 57 
(1) (a) CISG is no pillar of the Convention and is consequently not to be seen as 
a general principle in terms of 7 (2) CISG.300 
However, according to the predominant view in the jurisprudence as well as 
amongst commentators, including myself, art 57 CISG is seen to be an 
expression of a general principle to be applied on a wider scale. 
One court for example had to decide the place of payment of compensation due 
for non-conformity of the goods.301 It thereby decided that if – in accordance 
with art 57 CISG – the place of performance of the purchase price is the seller’s 
place of business, ‘this indicates a general principle valid for other monetary 
claims as well’. 
Another court had to decide at which place the seller had to restitute an excess in 
the price he had received from the buyer.302 The court held that the usual 
interpretation of art 57 (1) CISG allows the conclusion that payment has to be 
fulfilled at the creditor’s place of business. 
                                                 
299 See CLOUT case No. 312 [France: Cour d'appel [Court] Paris 14 January 1998, available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980114f1.html] 
300 See Brandner ‘Admissibility of Analogy’, part II. A. 2.; Ferrari ‘Gap-filling’, p. 84 
301 See CLOUT case No. 49 [Germany: Oberlandesgericht [Appellate Court] Düsseldorf 2 July 1993, 
available online at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930702g1.html] 
302 See France: Cour d'appel [Appellate Court] Grenoble, 23 October 1996, available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/961023f1.html 
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Finally, there is another decision – amongst others- suggesting the acceptance of 
a general principle of this kind.303 The Austrian Supreme Court had to decide the 
place of performance of restitution obligations in case of contract avoidance. 
They argued that by declaring the contract avoided it is not annulled but rather 
‘changed into a winding-up relationship’. Consequently, ‘the place of 
performance for the obligations concerning restitution should mirror the place of 
performance for the primary contractual obligations’. Applying this approach, it 
follows that if the buyer’s obligation to pay the purchase price was to perform at 
the seller’s place of business, the seller’s obligation to restitute this payment is to 
perform at the buyer’s place of business. 
Amongst those supporting the existence of a general principle based on art 57 (1) 
(a) CISG, the place for payment of damages is controversially discussed.304 
A German court held that the place for performance of the obligation which has 
been breached is decisive for determining the place for performance of a 
damages claim.305 
Due to practical problems posed by applying this view306, I support the view that 
in accordance with the principle embodied in art 57 CISG, the place of 
performance of damages claims is at the creditor’s place of business.307  
l) Dispatch principle 
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the CISG is based on the general 
principle according to which any kind of communication becomes effective on 
dispatch, unless the CISG therefore expressly demands receipt. 
Art 27 CISG contains the rule that if a communication was made or given by an 
appropriate means of communication, the recipient generally bears the risk of 
                                                 
303 See Austria: Oberster Gerichtshof [Supreme Court] 29 June 1999, available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990629a3.html 
304 See Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 57, para 25 for a summary of the dispute 
305 See Germany: Landgericht [District Court] Aachen 14 May 1994, available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/930514g1.html 
306 See Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 57, para 25, explaining these practical problems 
307 Same opinion shared for example by Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (24); Schlechtriem 
Commentary (2005), art 57, para 25 
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delay, loss or alteration during its transmission, unless the Convention expressly 
provides otherwise. 
According to its wording, this rule directly applies to part III of the Convention 
only and therefore not to part II and the formation of the contract. 
It is however widely accepted that the dispatch rule constitutes a general 
principle in terms of art 7 (2) CISG308 and therefore also applies with respect to 
communications in accordance with part II of the CISG as well as to any other 
communications the parties may have provided for in their contract, as long as 
the parties haven’t agreed otherwise or the Convention states to the contrary. 
According to that, this general principle is for example not applicable to an offer 
or an acceptance because of art 15 and 18 (2) CISG, demanding the receipt of 
such communications. 
Only a minority of legal scholars oppose this view. They decline the allegation 
that art 27 CISG contemplates a pillar of the Convention because it only deals 
with one particular issue.309  
The prevailing view amongst the scholars is also supported by several court 
decisions.310  
m) Theory of receipt 
In contrast to the dispatch principle, the CISG rules that some communications 
need to reach the recipient in order to become effective.311 This leads to the 
question how to determine under which circumstances a communication is to be 
seen as having reached the other party. Does the CISG contain a general 
principle to be applied in order to answer this question for all kind of 
                                                 
308 See for example Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (19); Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 7, 
para. 30; Ferrari ‘Gap-filling’, p. 86  
309 See Brandner ‘Admissibility of Analogy’, part II. A. 2. 
310 See Germany: Landgericht [District Court] Stuttgart 13 August 1991, available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/910813g1.html; CLOUT case No. 305 [Austria: Oberster Gerichtshof 
[Supreme Court] 30 June 1998, available online at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980630a3.html]; Italy: 
Tribunale [District Court] Rimini, November 26, 2002, available on the Internet at 
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=823&step=FullText 
311 See for example art 15 (1) CISG with respect to the offer and art 18 (2) CISG in relation to the 
acceptance 
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communication arising in connection with a sales contract, which is governed by 
the Convention?  
Art 24 CISG contains a definition for the determination when a particular 
communication is to be seen as having reached the other party. Because of its 
wording312, this definition directly applies only to communications embodied in 
part II of the CISG, concerned with the formation of the sales contract. What 
about the communications embodied in part III of the CISG which, in variation 
of art 27 CISG, expressly require to be received by the other party?313 
Almost everybody agrees on the fact that due to the general relevance of the 
definition enshrined in art 24 CISG, it shall not be restricted to communications 
contemplated in part II of the CISG.314 The rather theoretical question, whether 
the broad application of art 24 CISG results from extracting a general principle in 
terms of art 7 (2) CISG or from an analogous application seems to be solved 
inconsistently by the commentators.315 While some seem to favour the extensive 
application of art 24 CISG by analogy316, others believe this provision to be an 
expression of a general principle, on which the CISG is based.317 Additionally, 
there are some commentators, who seem to be inconsistent in their 
categorization.318  
Bearing in mind the distinction between both legal techniques as discussed in 
Chapter V. of this dissertation, I believe that speaking of an analogical 
application rather than of a general principle is in this case more suitable. It is 
merely one rule, embodied in art 24 CISG which is applied to other provisions of 
the Convention.  
                                                 
312 Art 24 CISG reads as follows: ‘For the purpose of this Part of the Convention […]’ 
313 See for example art 47 (2), 48 (4), 63 (2), 65 (1) and (2), 79 (4) CISG 
314 See for example Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 24, para 2; Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. 
b) (20); Honnold ‘Uniform Law for International Sales’, p. 201 
315 For a distinction of both legal techniques see Chapter V. 3. on p. 24 of this dissertation 
316 See Honnold ‘Uniform Law for International Sales’, p. 201 
317 See Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 24, para 2 
318 See for example Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (20), using the terminology ‘analogy’ with 
respect to the theory of receipt within a list of general principles on which the Convention is based  
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However, it has been mentioned that the importance of a clear distinction is 
rather of a theoretical nature.  
n) Passing of risk  
Art 67 (2) and 69 (3) CISG embody the rule that the risk doesn’t pass to the 
buyer as long as the goods aren’t clearly identified to the particular contract of 
sale.  
Some legal scholars – correctly – argue that this rule expresses a general 
principle in terms of art 7 (2) CISG, stating that the risk doesn’t pass to the buyer 
unless the goods are clearly identifiable to the specific contract.319 
Contrary to the above mentioned provisions, art 68 CISG, dealing with the sale 
of goods in transit, doesn’t contain such a restriction as to the passing of risk. 
According to its wording, the risk generally passes to the buyer ‘from the time of 
the conclusion of the contract’.  
Under specific circumstances, to be discussed in the following part, the general 
principle derived from art 67 (2) and 69 (3) CISG also applies with respect to art 
68 CISG. Although the latter provision deals with the sale of specific goods, it is 
possible that the seller may well sell an undivided amount of goods to more than 
one buyer (i.e. a collective consignment).320 If the specific contract of sale 
doesn’t allow the seller to deliver a collective consignment, the passing of risk as 
set out in art 68 CISG is not appropriate. Rather, the general principle underlying 
art 67 (2) and 69 (3) CISG should be applicable in order to determine the point of 
time, when the risk passes to the buyer.321 
                                                 
319 See for example Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (16); Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 68, 
para 6 
320 See Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 68, para 6 
321 See 320 
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o) Encumbrances and benefits 
Furthermore, the CISG lacks of a general rule, which determines from what point 
of time the buyer obtains the right to draw benefits from the goods and has the 
duty to bear their encumbrances. 
One effect of the contract avoidance is that – according to art 84 (2) CISG – the 
buyer can be obliged to account to the seller for all the benefits he has derived 
from the particular goods. From the notion of ‘benefits’ in this article it can be 
inferred that the buyer has to account for the net-benefits only,322 so that 
encumbrances diminish the sum to be handed over to the seller. 
Consequently, art 84 (2) CISG shows that the issue of benefits and encumbrances 
is a matter governed by the Convention. However, a regulation concerning the 
date from which the buyer is entitled to benefits and must bear the encumbrances 
is missing. 
It seems fair-minded to me to utilize the general rule for the passing of risk (see 
above fig. n)) in order to determine this point of time in the absence of any other 
agreement between the parties.323 
p) Computation of periods of time 
Art 20 (2) CISG gives rise for the assumption of another general principle on 
which the Convention is based. 
According to art 20 (2) 1st sentence, ‘official holidays or non-business days 
occurring during the period for acceptance are included in calculating the 
period’. The 2nd sentence expresses that if the notice of acceptance can’t be 
delivered on the last day of the period due to for example an official holiday, the 
period will be extended until the next business day. 
It is controversially discussed whether art 20 (2) CISG is the expression of a 
general principle to be applied on a wider scale. 
                                                 
322 See Schlechtriem UN-Kaufrecht, para 48 
323 This view is shared by Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (17) 
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Some scholars argue against the existence of such a general principle. They deny 
the conclusion that the Convention is based on the rule embodied in art 20 (2) 
CISG because this provision is much too detailed and moreover only related to 
time limits that it could be said that the Convention is based on it.324 
I believe – together with some important scholars325 – that art 20 (2) can be seen 
as the source for another general principle in terms of 7 (2) CISG, to be applied 
to other periods as well like for example periods concerning delivery and 
payment.  
As a consequence, official holidays or non-business days generally do not extend 
a particular period of time, unless the last day of this period falls on such a day. 
q) Principle of forfeiture 
Further, it is questionable whether the concept of forfeiture is also a thought 
contained in the CISG and can therefore be used in terms of art 7 (2) CISG. 
Although it is not possible to determine a prevailing view on this point, the 
concept of forfeiture should be seen as constituting a general principle in terms 
of art 7 (2) CISG. 
In fact, the concept of forfeiture is to be seen as an issue closely linked to the 
principle of good faith.326 
It barely means that a party can lose a right by not asserting it for a longer period 
of time and thus creating the impression for the other party that the first party 
will not assert these rights at all.327 
According to Magnus, the existence of such a principle within the CISG can be 
derived from those provisions generally establishing the principle of reliance 
protection like art 16(2) (b), 29 (2) 2nd sentence, 35 (2) (b) and art 42 (2) (b) 
CISG. 
                                                 
324 See Brandner ‘Admissibility of Analogy’, part II. A. 2. 
325 See for example Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (18); Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 7, 
para 30 
326 See Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (6); Schlechtriem Kommentar (2000), art 7, para 51; 
Schlechtriem UN-Kaufrecht, para 48 
327 See Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (6); Schlechtriem UN-Kaufrecht, para 48 
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He further believes that one example for the application of this principle of 
forfeiture is art 46 (1) CISG, which doesn’t contain any references to a time limit 
for the buyer’s right to claim delivery by the seller. In his opinion, the buyer 
forfeits his right to performance if he lets the contract rest for a longer time 
period such as one year or longer.328 This view is correct. 
r) Principle concerning issue of burden of proof 
Finally, I would now like to discuss an issue of the CISG, completely different to 
the ones mentioned before, but of great importance for the process of enforcing a 
particular right enshrined in the Convention. Namely, the issue of burden of 
proof, which is again an aspect controversially discussed in the light of art 7 (2) 
CISG. 
The main question to be answered is whether or not the issue of burden of proof 
is governed by the CISG and therefore allows the application of art 7 (2) CISG. 
Legal scholars disagree on this decisive categorisation. 
First of all, it has to be mentioned that a big group of draftsmen of the 
Convention disapproved to include a provision dealing with the issue of burden 
of proof in the Convention. They feared to regulate procedural matters together 
with this issue, for which the Conference had no mandate.329 
One group supports the view that this issue is not governed by the CISG and 
consequently refers to the domestic law in order to determine the principles to be 
applied regarding the burden of proof.330 Within this group there are diverging 
views as to how the applicable domestic law should be identified.331 
                                                 
328 See Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (6) 
329 See Schlechtriem UN-Kaufrecht, para 50 
330 See Ferrari ‘Burden of Proof’, part II with references; Please be aware of the fact that Ferrari seems to 
have mixed up the meaning of the term ‘gap praeter legem’ and gap ‘intra legem’ in this article. In another 
article (see Franco Ferrari ‘Specific Topics of the CISG in the Light of Judicial Application and Scholarly 
Writing’, available online at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/editorial/ferrari940615a3.html) he 
correctly refers to their meaning as was mentioned above in Chapter V. 1. on p. 20 of this dissertation  
331 See Ferrari ‘Burden of Proof’, part II 
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The vast majority of legal scholars however argue in favour of the burden of 
proof to be a matter governed by the CISG but not expressly in it.332 Their main 
argument for this conclusion is that the CISG itself implicitly provides at least 
one rule on the burden of proof in art 79 (1) CISG.333 Furthermore, they believe 
that the principles concerning the issue of burden of proof must be extracted 
from the CISG itself due to the close connection of the issue of burden of proof 
with the substantive law.334 In other words, it can be said that additionally to art 
79 CISG, several other provisions of the CISG allow, due to their wording, a 
conclusion as to the distribution of the burden of proof.335 The term ‘unless’ for 
example indicates the burden of proof to be lying with the party alleging this 
specific exemption.336 Finally, some provisions also presuppose a particular 
distribution of the burden of proof like for example art 44 CISG.337 A reasonable 
excuse for the failure to give the required notice, as mentioned in art 44 CISG, 
can only be given by the party asserting such an excuse. 
This prevailing view amongst legal scholars is also supported by numerous court 
decisions.338  
It must however be noted that there are also decisions in which the tribunals 
decided against the issue of burden of proof to be governed by the Convention 
and therefore decided according to the applicable domestic law.339  
                                                 
332 See Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (26); Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 7, para 30; 
Ferrari ‘Burden of Proof’, part II. 
333 See supra note 332 
334 See Ferrari ‘Burden of Proof’, part II. 
335 See Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (26) 
336 See supra note 335 
337 See supra note 335 
338 See CLOUT case No. 378 [Italy: Tribunale [District Court] Vigevano 12 July 2000, available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000712i3.html]; CLOUT case No. 380 [Italy: Tribunale [District Court] 
Pavia 29 December 1999, available online at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991229i3.html]; CLOUT 
case No. 196 [Switzerland: Handelsgericht [Commercial Court] Zürich 26 April 1995, available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950426s1.html]; CLOUT case No. 97 [Switzerland: Handelsgericht 
[Commercial Court] Zürich 9 September 1993, available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930909s1.html] 
339 See CLOUT case No. 261 [Switzerland: Bezirksgericht [District Court] Sanne 20 February 1997, 
available online at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970220s1.html]; CLOUT case No. 103 [ICC Court of 
Arbitration, case No. 6653 of 26 March 1993, available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/956653i1.html]; in one case, a state court referred to the problem of 
whether the Convention is based upon a particular general principle in respect of the issue of burden of 
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Both legal scholars340 as well as courts341, arguing in favour of the application of 
art 7 (2) CISG, have developed three general principles concerning the issue of 
burden of proof: 
(1) Any party has to prove the existence of the factual prerequisites of a 
particular provision from which it wants to derive beneficial legal 
consequences; 
(2) Any party asserting an exception in its favour has to prove the existence of 
the factual prerequisites of that exception; and  
(3) Those facts lying exclusively in a party's sphere of responsibility and which 
therefore are, at least theoretically, better known to that party have to be 
proven by the party exercising the control over that sphere.  
Due to the fact that severe differences exists between the chosen approaches to 
be found in different domestic laws all over the world, it is from my perspective 
very important to agree on the particular gap to be filled in accordance with art 7 
(2) CISG and the principles just mentioned before. This would also mean legal 
certainty on a very important aspect of the Convention. 
4. Rules not to be interpreted as general principles 
After having given a brief overview of the state of discussion in relation to those 
general principles which can be derived from the provisions of the CISG, I will now 
name some rules which – from my perspective – do not constitute general principles 
in terms of art 7 (2) CISG. 
                                                                                                                                                
proof or whether the issue is one not governed by the Convention, but left the issue open; see therefor 
CLOUT case No. 253 [Switzerland: Tribunale d'appello [Appellate Court ] Lugano 15 January 1998, 
available online at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980115s1.html] 
340 See Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (26) 
341 See especially CLOUT case No. 378 [Italy: Tribunale [District Court] Vigevano 12 July 2000, 
available online at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000712i3.html] 
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a) Currency of payment 
The following passage will focus on the question whether the CISG is based on 
the general principle stating that, in absence of a parties’ agreement to the 
contrary, the seller's place of business governs all questions relating to payment 
and therefore also governs the question of currency. 
It is controversially discussed whether the issue of currency of payment 
constitutes a gap within the scope of the Convention. 
The legal history shows that the delegates of the Vienna Convention voted 
against a Spanish proposal to include a provision fixing a specific method to 
determine the currency of payment.342 
According to the definition of a gap as an unintentional incompleteness343, this 
could mean that no such gap could be assumed and recourse to domestic law 
would be necessary. However, the definition of a gap must be seen as a basic rule 
with exceptions. The fact that the delegates didn’t agree on a specific issue 
doesn’t always mean that they wanted this issue not to be governed by the 
Convention. It can sometimes barely result from the failure to reach a 
compromise agreement.  
In fact, the issue of currency of the payment is such an important aspect for the 
whole transaction that it is hardly imaginable that this issue shall not be governed 
by the Convention.344 Accordingly, an internal gap of the Convention is to be 
assumed. This view was also expressed in a ruling of a German District Court.345 
The decisive question is now how to fill this gap.  
First of all, art 6 CISG and the overriding principle of party autonomy must be 
considered. A parties’ agreement with respect to the currency is of course 
binding. 
                                                 
342 See Koneru ‘The International Interpretation’, part II. C. 
343 See above Chapter V. 1. on p. 20 
344 This opinion is for example shared in Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 54, para 9 with several 
references to author scholars 
345 See Germany: Landgericht [District Court] Berlin 24 March 1998, available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980324g1.html 
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In the absence of such an agreement, art 9 CISG has to be taken into 
consideration.346 Are there usages or practices between the parties, indicating the 
currency in which the payment has to be done? According to Koneru, ‘the 
general rule based on trade usage seems to be that the currency will be that of the 
place of payment’.347 Due to art 57 (1) (a) CISG, this would be the seller's place 
of business unless the parties agree to the contrary. 
It is however questionable, whether such a general trade usage exists in 
international trade. 
If gap-filling in accordance with art 9 CISG is also unsuccessful, it is 
questionable whether another general principle can be derived from the 
Convention. 
For instance, it is believed that the Convention shows preference for the creditor 
in art 57 and 54 CISG. As a consequence, all payment claims shall be done in the 
currency at the seller’s place of business.348 
Contrary to that, other commentators share the view that domestic law must be 
applied.349 
The existing case law is not very helpful on this particular issue. The above 
mentioned German District Court did – unfortunately – not decide between these 
two approaches.350 
From my perspective, the view according to which domestic law is to be applied 
is correct. The fact that the payment has to be done at the seller’s place of 
business (art 57 (1) (a) CISG) can only be seen as an indication for the currency 
but not more. 
                                                 
346 See Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 54, para 9 
347 See Koneru ‘The International Interpretation’, part II. C. 
348 See Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (23) 
349 See Schlechtriem Commentary (1998), art 7, para 39; Schlechtriem Commentary (2005), art 54, para 9; 
Ferrari ‘Gap-filling’, p. 84 
350 See supra note 345 
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b) Issue of set-off 
There are also diverging views with respect to the issue of set-off. 
Again, it is questionable whether this is an issue governed, albeit not expressly 
settled, in the Convention. 
Although there is case law, which argues in favour of a gap praeter legem and 
the existence of a general principle in terms of 7 (2)CISG, permitting reciprocal 
claims arising under the Convention to be offset,351 the majority of the courts 
disagree with this view. From their perspective, the issue of set-off is a matter 
not governed by the Convention at all.352  
                                                 
351 See CLOUT case No. 348 [Germany: Oberlandesgericht [Appellate Court] Hamburg 26 November 
1999, available online at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991126g1.html] 
352 See for example Austria: Oberster Gerichtshof [Supreme Court] 22 October 2001, available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/011022a4.html; CLOUT case No. 378 [Italy: Tribunale [District Court] 
Vigevano 12 July 2000, available online at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000712i3.html]; Germany: 
Amtsgericht [Lower Court] Duisburg 13 April 2000, available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000413g1.html; CLOUT case No. 232 [Germany: Oberlandesgericht 
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October 1997, available online at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/971015g1.html; Germany: Landgericht 
[District Court] München 6 May 1997, available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970506g1.html; CLOUT case No. 275 [Germany: Oberlandesgericht 
[Appellate Court] Düsseldorf 24 April 1997, available online at 
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[Appellate Court] Düsseldorf 11 July 1996, available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960711g1.html]; Germany: Landgericht [District Court] Duisburg 17 
April 1996, available online at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960417g1.html; CLOUT case No. 289 
[Germany: Oberlandesgericht [Appellate Court] Stuttgart 21 August 1995, available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950821g1.html]; Germany: Landgericht [District Court] München 20 
March 1995, available online at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950320g1.html; Netherlands: Rechtbank 
[District Court] Middelburg 25 January 1995, available online at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950125n1.html; Germany: Amtsgericht [Lower Court] Mayen 6 
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No. 281 [Germany: Oberlandesgericht [Appellate Court] Koblenz 17 September 1993; available at 
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[Appellate Court] Hamm 9 June 1995; available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950609g1.html]; 
Netherlands: Rechtbank [District Court] Roermond 6 May 1993; available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930506n1.html; CLOUT case No. 99 [Netherlands Rechtbank [District 
Court ] Arnhem 25 February 1993, available online at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930225n1.html] 
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Some legal scholars like Magnus for example believe that a set-off should be 
granted directly by virtue of the Convention when both claims result from the 
contractual relationship governed by the latter.353 
Others follow the view expressed by the majority of courts and deny this issue to 
be governed by the CISG.354 
I believe that the latter view should be favoured due to the fact that the CISG 
itself gives no real argument supporting the contrary assumption. 
c) Seniority of payment claims 
Finally, the seniority of payment claims is also an issue to be investigated in 
terms of art 7 (2) CISG. 
Case law on ULIS is available, stating that the latter is based on the principle that 
in case of doubt, a payment should first be applied to default interest and in a 
second step against the oldest debt.355 
The existence of such a general principle was already questionable in relation to 
the ULIS due to the absence of any indication therefor in its provisions.356 
The same argumentation can be found with respect of the CISG.357 An 
examination of the provisions of the CISG offers no connecting factor for the 
conclusion that a general principle dealing with the seniority of payment claims 
exists.  
Together with other commentators,358 I support this view. The derivation of such 
a principle would be contrary to the rule that a general principle in terms of 
art 7 (2) CISG must result from it with sufficient clarity.359 
                                                 
353 See for example Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. b) (14) 
354 See for example Ferrari ‘Gap-filling’, p. 87 
355 See Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam, November 4, 1982, Ned. IPR 1983 No. 215; Netherlands: Rb. 
Alkmaar May 27, 1982 and Rb. Amsterdam (NL) March 5, 1980, to be found in Schlechtriem 
Internationale Rechtsprechung, art 17 EKG, para 4, 6 
356 See Magnus ‘General Principles’, part 5. c) (2) 
357 See supra note 356 
358 See for example Schlechtriem Commentary (1998), art 7, para 39 
359 See above Chapter V. 4. b) on p. 29 of this dissertation 
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5. Principles to be found outside the CISG 
After having given an overview of the general principles to be derived from the 
provisions of the CISG, the following part of this dissertation will now deal with 
principles which – although they are found outside the CISG – can be used to fill 
gaps in accordance with art 7 (2) CISG. 
a) General comments 
As we have already seen above, the Unidroit Principles and the Lando Principles 
can be used for gap-filling in terms of art 7 (2) CISG only when the particular 
principle can be seen as an expression of a general principle on which the CISG 
is based.360  
This means that the Unidroit Principles can be used to affirm the solution of the 
case at hand on the basis of a general principle of the CISG due to their 
‘persuasive authority’.361 
Furthermore, they can be applied in order to clarify the content of the often 
somehow vague and abstract general principle derived from the provisions of the 
CISG.362 
These statements also apply in relation to the Lando Principles.363 
b) Examples of the Unidroit Principles 
Providing an exhaustive list of the provisions of the Unidroit Principles and 
Lando Principles used in accordance with art 7 (2) CISG is of limited value 
because of this restricted way of using both sets of rules with respect to fill gaps 
within the scope of the CISG. Consequently, I will limit the following 
                                                 
360 See Chapter V. 4. b) cc) on p. 32 of this dissertation  
361 See Schlechtriem Kommentar (2000), art 7, para 63; Ferrari ‘Das Verhältnis zwischen Unidroit und 
allgemeinen Grundsätzen’, p. 16 
362 See Schlechtriem Kommentar (2000), art 7, para 64; Ferrari ‘Das Verhältnis zwischen Unidroit und 
allgemeinen Grundsätzen’, p. 16 
363 See Chapter  V. 4. b) cc) on p. 32 of this dissertation in case these two sets of principles contain 
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enumeration to a few examples of the Unidroit Principles, which are often named 
in this context. 
aa) Good faith principle 
As has been discussed above, the CISG is based on the general principle of 
good faith.364  
This Principle is laid down in art 1.7 of the Unidroit Principles, too. In order 
to fill gaps within the Convention in terms of art 7 (2) CISG, reference is 
made to art 2.1.15 and 2.1.16 of the Unidroit Principles. The latter 
provisions, dealing with ‘negotiations in bad faith’ (art 2.1.15) and the ‘duty 
of confidentiality’ (art 2.1.16), are seen as expressions of the principle of 
good faith and are therefore an admissible gap-filling source.365   
bb) Principle of reasonableness 
Furthermore, it is referred to the art 6.1.7, 6.1.8 and 6.1.9 of the Unidroit 
Principles as they are seen to be expressions of the principle of 
reasonableness, on which the CISG is based as well.366 The duty of the 
parties to the contract to act in a reasonable manner clearly underlies all those 
provisions. Specifically, they regulate whether a party is entitled to pay by 
cheque or any similar instruments or by funds transfer and if so, under what 
conditions. 
cc) Principle of full compensation 
The principle of full compensation367 is also a general principle often 
mentioned in relation to gap-filling with the help of the Unidroit Principles. 
                                                 
364 See Chapter VI. 2. of this dissertation at p. 41 
365 See Bonell ‘The Unidroit Principles and CISG’, part 3. (b) 
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Reference is made to art 7.4.9 paragraph (1) and (2) and art 7.4.12 of the 
Unidroit Principles.368 
Paragraph (1) of art 7.4.9 states that interest is to be paid from the time the 
payment is due. 
Reference to paragraph (2) of art 7.4.9 – determining the rate of interest – is 
from my point of view inappropriate. As has been discussed earlier in this 
dissertation, it is correct to deny the rate of interest to be an issue governed 
by the CISG.369 
Art 7.4.12 of the Unidroit Principles deals with the currency in which 
damages have to be assessed. 
dd) Place of payment 
Also art 6.1.6 (1) (a) of the Unidroit Principles is named in accordance with 
art 7 (2) CISG.370 According to this provision, all monetary obligations are to 
be performed at the obligee’s place of business. This corresponds with the 
general principle of how to determine the place of payment of all monetary 
obligations, on which the CISG is based.371  
ee) Favor contractus principle 
Finally, it is controversially discussed whether art 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 of the 
Unidroit Principles – dealing with issues of ‘hardship’ – can be used in terms 
of art 7 (2) CISG as the expression of the favor contractus principle372 of the 
CISG.373 It is questionable whether the issue of hardship constitutes a true 
                                                 
368 See Felemegas ‘Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation’, p. 309-310; Bonell ‘The Unidroit Principles and 
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371 See Chapter VI. 3. k) of this dissertation on p. 66 
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gap in the CISG because of art 79 CISG, setting out the grounds for 
exemption of liability in an exhaustive manner.374  
I believe that hardship should be of no relevance under the CISG as long as it 
doesn’t constitute an ‘impediment’ in terms of art 79 (1) CISG.375 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Recapitulating, the goal of this dissertation was not merely to give an overview of the 
whole issue of gap-filling in the CISG. The primary goal was rather to enhance the 
sensibility of everybody, applying the CISG, to always bear in mind the ultimate goal of 
the CISG to promote uniformity in its application. 
At the same time, this doesn’t mean that the wording of art 7 (2) CISG can be ignored. 
Both the limitation to general principles on which the CISG is based as well as the 
possibility to resort to domestic law must be respected. 
The uniform application of the Convention on the field of gap-filling can only be 
achieved by the development of a consistent international jurisprudence. An important 
precondition for realising this target, namely the availability of international 
jurisprudence on the CISG, was accomplished by creating the databases of Unilex and 
Uncitral. As a consequence, the courts shouldn’t feel obliged to refer to their national 
law anymore only because of the inaccessibility of international case law. 
Hopefully, this dissertation can contribute to this effect. 
                                                 
374 See supra note 370 
375 The same opinion is shared in Bonell ‘The Unidroit Principles and CISG’ in part 3. (b) 
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